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I. 
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
This appeal is from a memorandum decision dated June 17,2011, and the subsequent 
order dated July 26, 2011. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann § 78A-3-102 (2011). 
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IL 
ISSUES PRESENTED & STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. ISSUE PRESENTED 
Where two insurance policies potentially apply to a loss, may an insured elect which 
of its insurers is to cover the loss by tendering its defense to only one insurer, and not the 
other, and thereby foreclose the insurer to whom the claim was tendered from obtaining 
contribution from the other insurer? This issue was preserved at R. 114-18. 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c) (2011). Because summary judgment involves questions of law, no deference is granted 
to the district court's ruling and it is reviewed for correctness. Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 
If 6, 177 P.3d 600 (2008); Mitchell v. Christensen. 2001 UT 80, f 8, 31 P.3d 572 (2001). 
2. ISSUE PRESENTED 
Where an insured has more than one policy potentially covering a loss, may a insurer 
tender a claim to another insurer pursuant to an "other insurance" clause, where such a tender 
is against the express wishes of the insured? This issue was preserved at R. 117-18. 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c) (2011). Because summary judgment involves questions of law, no deference is granted 
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to the district court's ruling and it is reviewed for correctness. Orvis v. Johnson. 2008 UT 2, 
U 6,177 P.3d 600 (2008); Mitchell v. Christensen. 2001 UT 80, K 8, 31 P.3d 572 (2001). 
3. ISSUE PRESENTED 
Did the trial court err in concluding that, as a matter of law, no discovery - other than 
an initial set of interrogatories and requests for production - was warranted? This issue was 
preserved at R. 109-10. 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A denial of a request for additional discovery under Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f) is reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard. Price Dev. Co. v. Orem City. 2000 UT 26, ^ f 30,995 
P.2d 1237 (2000); Crossland Sav. v. Hatch. 877 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1994). 
4. ISSUE PRESENTED 
Did the trial court err in concluding that, as a matter of law, UBIC was prohibited 
from conducting discovery and introducing parol evidence regarding the intent of Pioneer 
Roofing Company and UBIC with respect to the commencement date for the 2008 policy? 
This issue was preserved at R. 110-14. 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c) (2011). Because summary judgment involves questions of law, no deference is granted 
to the district court's ruling and it is reviewed for correctness. Orvis v. Johnson. 2008 UT 2, 
f 6, 177 P.3d 600 (2008); Mitchell v. Christensen. 2001 UT 80, \ 8, 31 P.3d 572 (2001). 
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III. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f) (2011) provides: 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the 
motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court 
may refuse the application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to 
be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as 
is just. 
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IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This appeal requires that this Court consider whether the targeted tender rule, which 
has been adopted in several other jurisdictions, should be adopted in Utah. In this case, it is 
undisputed that the insured, Pioneer Roofing Company ("Pioneer"), tendered the claim of its 
injured employee to Workers Compensation Fund ("WCF"), but never tendered the claim to 
its other insurer, Utah Business Insurance Company ("UBIC"). Indeed, Pioneer specifically 
instructed UBIC in writing not to get involved, and expressing its desire that WCF pay the 
claim. At issue is whether WCF, pursuant to an "other insurance" clause, can override the 
clear and undisputed wishes of the insured and seek contribution from UBIC - effectively 
resulting in a forced tender of the claim by Pioneer to UBIC. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
1. On August 5,2010, WCF filed a Complaint for Declaratory Relief in the Third 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah. R. 1 -16. The basis for the Complaint was 
a request for a determination whether identical "other insurance" clauses in WCF's and 
UBIC's policies obligated UBIC to share in the medical and indemnity costs advanced by 
WCF to Russell Antone. Id 
2. On October 13, 2010, UBIC filed its Answer. R. 22-27. 
3. On March 11, 2011, WCF filed its motion for partial summary judgment, 
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seeking the entry of judgment based upon the twin "other insurance" clauses. R. 53-55. 
4. On March 28, 2011, UBIC filed its opposition to WCF's motion for partial 
summary judgment. R. 100-156. On the same day, UBIC also filed a countermotion for 
summary judgment in which UBIC advanced the argument that the targeted tender rule 
should be applied. R. 97-99. 
5. On April 18, 2011, WCF filed its reply to the opposition to the motion for 
partial summary judgment. R. 167-347. On the same day, WCF also filed its opposition to 
UBIC's countermotion for summary judgment. Id. 
6. On April 22,2011, UBIC filed its reply to the opposition to the countermotion 
for summary judgment. R. 348-346. 
7. On June 15, 2011, oral argument was held before Judge Maughan regarding 
the motions for summary judgment. R. 370. 
8. On June 17, 2011, Judge Maughan issued a memorandum decision granting 
WCF's motion for partial summary judgment and denying UBIC's countermotion for 
summary judgment. R. 371-375. 
9. On July 26,2011, Judge Maughan entered an Order consistent with the analysis 
and conclusions set forth in the memorandum decision, and he certified the judgment as final. 
R. 378-385. 
10. On August 16, 2011, UBIC filed its Notice of Appeal. R. 386-396. 
11. Effective September 15,2011, the Supreme Court entered an order transferring 
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the case from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals, subject to a request for retention 
by either party. R. 410-411. 
12. On October 13, 2011, after considering the submission of both parties with 
respect to retention, the Supreme Court ordered that it would retain the case. R. 412-413. 
C. Statement of Facts 
On March 21, 2008, Russell Antone was employed by Pioneer at a roofing project 
located in Salt Lake City, Utah. R. 3, 58,102. While Mr. Antone was working on the roof 
he fell through a skylight opening, landing on the floor approximately twelve feet below. Id, 
Mr. Antone suffered severe spinal injuries and is a paraplegic. LI 
Following the accident, Pioneer notified its workers compensation insurance carrier, 
WCF, of the accident involving Mr. Antone. R. 58. WCF accepted the claim as 
compensable and assumed its obligations under the policy by paying all medical expenses 
and indemnity benefits to Mr. Antone. R. 58. 
At the time of the industrial accident, Pioneer was purportedly covered by two 
workers compensation insurance policies - one policy with WCF and another with UBIC. 
R. 53-54. Pioneer had recently attempted to switch workers compensation insurance carriers, 
and the UBIC policy mistakenly initiated coverage for Pioneer prior to the expiration of the 
WCF policy. R. 104-108. As a result, the WCF policy had a coverage period of April 1, 
2007 through April 1,2008, and the UBIC policy had a coverage period of February 22,2008 
through February 22,2009. R. 57. There was, therefore, 39 days of overlapped coverage -
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assuming that Pioneer intended to have dual coverage at all. 14 Both policies had identical 
"other insurance" clauses, which provided as follows: 
We will not pay more than our share of benefits and costs 
covered by this insurance and other insurance or self-insurance. 
Subject to any limits of liability that apply, all shares will be 
paid equal until the loss is paid. If any insurance or self-
insurance is exhausted, the shares of all remaining insurance 
will be equal until the loss is paid. 
R. 57-58, 107. 
On March 10, 2010, nearly two years after the date of the industrial accident, WCF 
notified UBIC of the overlapping coverage and demanded payment from UBIC pursuant to 
the "other insurance" clause. R. 271-72. Until notified by WCF, UBIC had no knowledge 
of the overlapping policies or of the accident suffered by Mr. Antone. R. 108. Pioneer never 
tendered the claim to UBIC, nor is there any language in either WCF's or UBIC's policy that 
required Pioneer to tender the claim to both insurers. R. 9-16,117-18,126,204-231. Upon 
learning that there was potentially overlapping workers compensation insurance coverage, 
Pioneer made it clear to UBIC that it did not want UBIC to pay the claim. R. 346. Pioneer 
also expressed its desire that WCF pay the claim, h i In October of 2010, John Stout, the 
owner of Pioneer, wrote a letter to UBIC stating that it was always Pioneer's intention that 
WCF pay the claim and that UBIC should not get involved. 14 To date, UBIC has not paid 
any costs or expenses associated with Mr. Antone's claim. R. 59. Pioneer paid all premiums 
due to WCF. R. 126. 
< 
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V. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court's order, which requires UBIC to prorate on a 50/50 basis the medical 
and indemnity costs paid to Mr. Antone, is in error. The targeted tender doctrine, which 
should be adopted in Utah, upholds the wishes of an insured to choose whether to tender a 
claim and, if multiple policies could potentially cover a loss, whether to tender to claim to 
some, or all, of its insurers. The right of an insured to select which of its insurers should 
respond to a claim is a protected and paramount right. The presence of an "other insurance" 
clause does not trump this right - it only directs the court how to apportion the damages 
among carriers legally obligated to pay a claim. Where there is no tender by an insured, there 
is no legal obligation by the insurer to pay. 
The undisputed facts in this case show that Pioneer Roofing never tendered the claim 
to UBIC and affirmatively declared its intention that WCF pay the claim. By this election, 
the UBIC policy is unavailable to pay the loss. The "other insurance" clause is irrelevant 
because the WCF policy is the only policy available to pay the claim - there is no "other" 
insurance. 
In the alternative, and assuming that the targeted tender rule is not adopted by this 
Court, the case should nevertheless be remanded for further discovery. Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(f) provides a safeguard against an improvident or premature grant of summary 
judgment. It is applied liberally to ensure that the parties are granted the time to conduct the 
Page 9 of49 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
necessary factual exploration that, if denied, forces a party to prematurely prove its case. 
UBIC's request to conduct additional discovery was neither dilatory nor lacking in merit, but 
was justified, and the trial court erred in denying the Rule 56(f) motion. 
Finally, extrinsic evidence, including parol evidence, may be introduced to show 
mutual mistake, even where a writing is unambiguous. The evidence may be introduced to 
show that the writing does not conform to the intent of the parties. It is reversible error for 
a trial court to grant a motion for summary judgment where there is a factual issue as to what 
the parties intended. 
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VI. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The district court erred when it ordered that WCF could seek equitable 
contribution from UBIC where Pioneer, the insured, never tendered the claim 
to UBIC. 
Equitable contribution has long been recognized as a remedy that permits one insurer 
to recover from another insurer who is also responsible for the loss. However, an insurer is 
not liable to defend or indemnify a claim until the insured provides notice of the claim to the 
insurer. While some states require a formal "tender" of the claim from the insured to the 
insurer, others merely require notice from the insured. However, the common thread running 
through these decisions is that the insured must advise the insurer of the loss to trigger the 
insurer's obligation under the policy. No other person - not even another insurer - may 
tender a claim on behalf of an insured. 
As will be demonstrated below, Pioneer never tendered the claim involving Mr. 
Antone to UBIC. Instead, when WCF demanded contribution from UBIC, Pioneer 
specifically advised UBIC that it had tendered the claim to WCF and that UBIC was not to 
get involved. R. 346. Pioneer also specifically expressed its intention that WCF pay the 
claim, not UBIC. WL Therefore, UBIC has no obligation to pay the claim. The right of an 
insured to determine whether, and to whom, a claim should be tendered is a paramount right 
that must be protected. To conclude otherwise requires a finding that WCF - a stranger to 
the contract between Pioneer and UBIC - has greater rights to detemiine whether a claim 
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should be tendered than does Pioneer. Contrary to the rulings of multiple other jurisdictions 
that have considered the issue, the district court below erred in trampling the rights of 
Pioneer to tender this claim. The judgment of the district court should be reversed, and the 
targeted tender rule should be adopted in Utah. 
L Equitable contribution may only be sought from other insurers to whom 
the claim has been tendered. 
Equitable contribution refers to the right of one party to recover from another party 
for a common liability. Firemanfs Fund Ins. Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 65 Cal. App. 4th 1279, 
1293, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 296 (1998). In the context of insurance law, equitable contribution 
"permits an insurer, which has paid a claim, to seek contribution directly from other insurers 
who are liable for the same loss " Casualty Indem. Exch. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Nat'l Fire 
Ins. Co.. 902 F. Supp. 1235, 1237 (D. Mont. 1995): see also Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. 
v. USF Ins. Co.. 191 P.3d 866, 872 (Wash. 2008). 
In deciding whether one insurer is liable to another insurer for equitable contribution, 
"the inquiry is whether the nonparticipating coinsurer 'had a legal obligation'" to provide 
defense or indemnity coverage. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Superior Court. 140 Cal. App. 4th 
874, 879,44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 841 (2006) (quoting American Continental Ins. Co. v. American 
Casualty Co., 86 Cal. App. 4th 929, 938, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 632 (2001)). "Equity provides 
no right for an insurer to seek contribution from another insurer who has no obligation to the 
insured." Mutual of Enumclaw. 191 P.3d at 872 (Wash. 2008) (citing Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. 
v. Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 826 P.2d 1315 (Idaho 1992)); see also Forum Ins. Co. v. 
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Ranger Ins. Co.. 711 F. Supp. 909 (N.D. 111. 1989); Marwell Constr.. Inc. v. Underwriters at 
Lloyd's. London. 465 P.2d 298 (Alaska 1970); Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co.. 366 P.2d 
455 (Cal. 1961); Nat'l Indem. Co. v. St. Paul Ins. Cos.. 724 P.2d 544 (Ariz. 1986); Sharon 
Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co.. 931 P.2d 127, 137 (Utah 1997) (holding that 
contribution by one insurer from another is only permitted where the other insurer(s) had an 
equal legal obligation to defend the insured yet failed to do so). Similarly, equitable 
contribution is equally unavailable as between coinsurers that do not share the "same level 
of liability on the same risk as to the same insured." Safeco Ins. Co.. 140 Cal. App. 4th at 
879, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 841 (2006). "An insurer who, pursuant to its policy obligations, 
undertakes the defense of its insured, has no right to contribution... from a second insurer, 
absent a request from the common insured that it join in the defense." Federated Mutual Ins. 
Co. v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co.. 480 F. Supp. 599,600 (D. Term. 1979).1 Where the 
1
 While several of the cases cited involve the duty to defend, this case involves only 
the duty to indemnify. The two duties are distinct in that the duty to defend arises when a 
complaint contains any allegations that could make an insurer liable to an insured under the 
policy, while the duty to indemnify arises when an insured is actually liable to a claimant and 
that claimant's injury is covered by the language of the policy. Hayden v. Mut. of Enumclaw 
Ins. Co.. 1 P.3d 1167, 1172 (Wash. 2000). It is also well settled that the duty to defend is 
broader than the duty to indemnify. Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co.. 931 P.2d 
127, 133 (Utah 1997). Because the duty to defend is broader than an insurer's duty to 
indemnify, where there is not a duty to defend, there is no duty to indemnify. See Lee R. 
Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, 14 Couch on Insurance § 200:3 (3d ed., West 2010); Great 
American Ins. Co. v. Calli Homes. Inc.. 236 F. Supp. 2d 693, 698 (S.D. Tex. 2002). The 
principle that an insurer cannot anticipate when or if an insured will make a claim, and that 
it is the insured that must tender the claim to the insurer to invoke coverage, applies equally 
well to the duty to indemnify and the duty to defend. 
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insured neither discloses the claim nor requests that the insurer assist, there is no tender. 
This legal principle was best set forth by the Washington Supreme Court, which stated: 
[A]n insurer cannot be expected to anticipate when or if an 
insured will make a claim for coverage; the insured must 
affirmatively inform the insurer that its participation is desired. 
Thus, breach of the duty to defend cannot occur before tender. 
The duties to defend and indemnify do not become legal 
obligations until a claim for defense or indemnity is tendered. 
Further, the insurer who seeks contribution does not sit in the 
place of the insured and cannot tender a claim to the other 
insurer. Thus, if the insured has not tendered a claim to an 
insurer prior to settlement or the end of trial, other insurers 
cannot recover in equitable contribution against that insurer. 
Mutual of Enumclaw, 191 P.3d at 873 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also 
Cellex Biosciences, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.. 537 N.W.2d 621,623 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1995) ("Tender is a condition precedent to creation of a duty to indemnify.5'); Hartford 
Accident and Indemnity Company v. Gulf Insurance Company, 776 F.2d 1380,1383 (7th Cir. 
1985). "The duty to defend is a continuing one, arising on tender of defense and lasting until 
the underlying lawsuit is concluded, or until it has been shown that there is no potential for 
coverage . . . . " Foster-Gardner, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins Co., 18 Cal. 4th 857, 869, 
77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 107 (1998); Buss v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 4th 35,46,65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 366 
(1997). Phrased somewhat differently, "[t]he duty to defend arises when the insured tenders 
defense of the third party lawsuit to the insurer." Foster-Gardner, 18 Cal 4th at 886, 77 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 107; 14 Couch on Insurance § 200.40 (noting that the insured generally is required 
to tender a claim to all insurers which the insured wants to respond to the claim); see also 
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CargilL Inc. v. ACE American Ins. Co.. 784 N.W.2d 341,354 (Minn. 2010) (holding that "a 
primary insurer that has a duty to defend, and whose policy is triggered for defense purposes, 
has an equitable right to seek contribution for defense costs from any other insurer who also 
has a duty to defend the insured, and whose policy has been triggered for defense 
purposes.")-
Only the insured, or an authorized agent acting at the specific request of the insured, 
can properly tender a claim and trigger coverage. Institute of London Underwriters v. 
Hartford Fire Insurance Company. 599 N.E.2d 1311,1313 (111. Ct. App. 1992); Bituminous 
Casualty Corp. v. Roval Insurance Co. of America. 704 N.E.2d 74, 79 (111. 1998); Hartford 
Accident and Indemnity, 776 F.2d at 1383. The express instruction of an insured controls 
as to whether or to what extent an insurer has a duty to defend. Schilli Leasing, Inc. v. 
Forum Insurance Company, 628 N.E.2d 185 (111. Ct. App. 1993). Simply put, where an 
insured has not tendered a claim to an insurer, that insurer is excused from its duties under 
the policy. Casualty Indem. Exchange Ins. Co., 902 F. Supp. at 1239; Solo Cup v. Federal 
Insurance Co., 619 F.2d 1178,1183 (7th Cir. 1980). 
The reasoning underlying this rule is logical: "an insurer cannot be expected to 
anticipate when or if an insured will make a claim for coverage; the insured must 
affirmatively inform the insurer that its participation is desired." Grifin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
29 P.3d 777,781 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Unigard Ins. Co. v. Leven. 983 P.2d 1155 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1997)). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has stated in this regard: 
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[M]ere knowledge that an insured is sued does not constitute 
tender of a claim. What is required is knowledge that the suit is 
potentially within the policy's coverage coupled with knowledge 
that the insurer's assistance is desired. An insurance company 
is not required to intermeddle officiously where its services have 
not been requested. 
Hartford Accident and Indemnity. 776 F.2d at 1383 (citations omitted); see also Casualty 
Indem. Exch. Ins. Co.. 902 F. Supp. at 1239; Purvis v. Hartford Ace, and Indem. Co.. 877 
P.2d 827 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). 
Although an occurrence during the policy period may give rise to a potential claim, 
an insurer cannot fairly or logically be expected to discharge its duties under the policy 
before or until such time as it has been notified of the claim by the insured. Several state 
supreme courts and intermediate appellate courts have opined that, while little is required to 
invoke an insurer's duties under an insurance policy, at a minimum, notice of the claim must 
be given by the insured to the insurer. See Cincinnati Cos. v. West Am. Ins. Co.. 701 N.E.2d 
499,504 (111. 1998) (holding that "the better rule is one which allows actual notice of a claim 
to trigger the insurer's duty to defend, irrespective of the level of the insured's sophistication, 
except where the insured has knowingly forgone the insurer's assistance."); White Mountain 
i 
Constr. Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co.. 631 A.2d 907,910 (N.H. 1993) (holding that "in order 
for an insured to tender the defense to the insurer, it need only put the insurer on notice of 
the claim."); Towne Realty. Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co.. 548 N.W.2d 64,67 (Wis. 1996) (holding 
that "[a] tender of defense occurs once an insured has been put on notice of a claim against 
the insured."); Home Ins. Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. of Pittsburgh. 658 N.W.2d 522 < 
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(Minn. 2003); Cobb v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 488 So.2d 349, 350 (La. Ct. App. 
1986); Widener Univ. v. F.S. James & Co.. 537 A.2d 829, 833 (Pa. Super. 1988); see also 
Hartford Accident and Indemnity, 776 F.2d at 13 83; Casualty Indem. Exchange Ins. Co.. 902 
F. Supp. at 1239; Litton Systems. Inc. v. Shaw's Sales & Serv.. Ltd.. 579 P.2d 48, 52 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1978); American Mut. Liab. Ins. v. Michigan Mut. Liab.. 235 N.W.2d 769 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1975) (each holding that the insured must not only give notice to the insurer, but 
must specifically request that the insured defend the suit). Thus, an insurer has no duties 
under the policy, nor can it breach any duty under the policy, prior to the insured tendering 
the claim. Grifin. 29 P.3d at 782; see also McCartv v. Parks. 564 P.2d 1122, 1123 (Utah 
1977) (noting that an insurer must receive notice of a claim and be provided an opportunity 
to defend prior to being bound by any judgment). 
In this instance, the district court erred in concluding that WCF could seek equitable 
contribution from UBIC. The undisputed evidence in this case shows that neither Pioneer 
nor anyone acting on Pioneer's behalf ever tendered the claim to UBIC. R. 117-18,126. In 
fact, UBIC was not even aware that Mr. Antone had sustained an accident until two years 
after it had occurred, and this notice came from WCF, not Pioneer. Id Pioneer subsequently 
unequivocally stated its desire that WCF pay the claim and that UBIC should not pay it. R. 
346. Without a tender of the claim by Pioneer to UBIC, UBIC was under no legal obligation 
to pay the claim. UBIC should not be compelled to pay a claim that was never tendered to 
it and which Pioneer has specifically requested that it not cover. The order of the district 
Page 17 of 49 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
court should be reversed and judgment entered in favor of UBIC. 
2. The targeted tender rule2 protects an insured's paramount right to choose 
whether to tender a claim to an insurer. 
Factual situations occasionally arise where an insured has multiple insurance policies 
potentially covering the same claim. In these circumstances, the insured typically elects to 
tender the claim to all available insurers, leaving the insurers to argue over the language of 
the various policies to determine how the loss should be allocated. These finger-pointing 
disputes often result in litigation, with the claim sometimes left unpaid for years until there 
is a resolution. The issue of tender in these cases is never raised because the insured has 
tendered to all available carriers. 
However, on rare occasions, an insured will elect to tender a claim to fewer than all 
available insurers.3 When presented with these narrow facts, courts have fashioned a rule -
2
 The targeted tender rule is sometimes referred to as the "selective tender rule" or the 
"doctrine of selective non-tender." For purposes of this appeal, the doctrine will be referred 
to as the targeted tender rule. 
3
 The targeted tender rule applies only among concurrent primary insurers (which 
UBIC and WCF are in this case). The situation is much different, however, where the 
insurers provide different types of coverage, such as between a primary insurance policy and 
an excess insurance policy. When the insurers do not stand in the same position relative to 
each other, an insured cannot use the targeted tender rule to choose to impose a coverage 
duty on an insurer with an "other insurance" excess provision in its policy to the exclusion 
of other co-insurers with whom the insured holds a primaiy policy. Under these 
circumstances, an insured must first exhaust all its primary coverage. See, e ^ , Kajima 
Construction Services. Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 879 N.E.2d 305 (111. 
2007). Accordingly, in Kajima, the insured, despite its targeted tender to the excess carrier, 
was required to first exhaust the limits of its primary policy prior to legally invoking 
coverage under the excess policy. Id. 
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the targeted tender mle - to protect the insured's right to choose to whom it wishes to tender 
a claim. While the application of this doctrine is an issue of first impression in Utah, the 
targeted tender mle should, nevertheless, be adopted. 
To illustrate the application of the targeted tender mle, the underlying facts and 
reasoning by the Illinois Supreme Court in John Bums Constr. Co. v. Indiana Ins. Co., 727 
N.E.2d 211 (111. 2000) are instructive. In Bums, the insured, John Bums Constmction 
Company, tendered the defense of a personal injury claim to Indiana Insurance Company. 
Id at 213. Bums made it clear that it did not want Royal Insurance, another carrier insuring 
Bums that could potentially cover the loss, to become involved in the claim. Id When 
Indiana refused Bums' tender, Bums and Royal jointly filed a declaratory judgment action 
against Indiana, seeking a declaration that Indiana had the sole duty to defend and indemnify 
Bums pursuant to the targeted tender. Ld Indiana counterclaimed in the suit, claiming that 
the costs should be shared equally with Royal pursuant to the "other insurance" clause 
present in both policies. Id at 214. Indiana argued that "its policy contemplates that more 
than one insurer might face exposure and that the policy provides a formula for sharing the 
costs of defending and indemnifying the claim." Id at 215. The Illinois Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court's judgment that Bums' tender to Indiana triggered the "other 
insurance" clause in Indiana's policy which, in turn, triggered Royal's duty to defend.4 Id 
4
 Notably, this "domino-theory" of tendering a claim is the same conclusion that the 
district court judge reached in this case, noting that "Pioneer's tender of this claim to WCF 
rather than to UBIC is irrelevant." R. 371-374. Just as the Illinois Supreme Court rejected 
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at 214. In other words, both lower courts concluded that an "other insurance" clause trumps 
an insured's right to choose whether, and to whom, a claim should be tendered. 
Burns appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court. The issue on appeal, which is the 
precise issue before this Court, was "whether an insurer to whom litigation is tendered and 
whose policy contains an 'other insurance' clause . . . may seek contribution from another 
insurer whose policy is in existence but whose coverage the insured has refused to invoke." 
Id at 214. In reversing the decision of the court of appeals, the court concluded that an 
insured has the right to choose to whom a claim should be tendered, notwithstanding the 
presence of an "other insurance" clause. The court stated: 
It is only when an insurer's policy is triggered that the insurer 
becomes liable for the defense and indemnity costs of a claim 
and it becomes necessary to allocate the loss among co-insurers. 
The loss will be allocated according to the terms of the "other 
insurance" clauses, if any, in the policies that have been 
triggered. 
An "other insurance" clause in a policy will not automatically 
reach into coverages provided under other policies merely 
because such other policies are in existence. The insured still 
must be given the right to determine whether it wishes to invoke 
its rights to such other coverages before those coverages 
become accessible under the uother insurance "provision oj a 
triggered policy. 
Burns, 727 N.E.2d at 216 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
this flawed reasoning in Burns, this Court should similarly reject the flawed conclusion of 
the district court. 
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The Bums court continued: 
The insurance provided to Burns by Royal was not "available," 
in the language oj the "other insurance " provision, for Bums 
had expressly declined to invoke that coverage. Moreover, we 
do not believe that the presence of the "other insurance" 
provision in the Indiana policy serves by itself to trigger the 
coverage afforded by Royal's policy. An "other insurance" 
provision does not in itself overcome the right of an insured to 
tender defense of an action to one insurer alone. 
Bums made clear that it did not want Royal to become involved 
in the matter and that the defense was being tendered solely to 
Indiana. Therefore, Indiana was foreclosed from seeking 
equitable contribution from Royal. 
Bums, 727 N.E.2d at 217 (emphasis added). 
An "other insurance" clause does not trigger obligations in any other policy available 
to pay a loss, nor does it empower insurers to tender a claim to another insurer. Rather, the 
purpose of an "other insurance" clause is to apportion a loss, based upon the terms of the 
"other insurance" clause - whether pro-rata, escape, or excess - among those policies 
obligated to cover the loss.5 See 15 Couch on Insurance § 219:1; 219:9. 
Because notice is required to trigger coverage under a policy, the failure to tender a 
5
 To put it another way, an "other insurance" clause only acts at the insurer level. It 
does not affect the right of an insured to recover, or an insured's right to forego making a 
claim, under a particular policy. See 15 Couch on Insurance § 219:1; Chemical Leaman 
Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 817 F. Supp. 1136, 1154 fn. 11 (D.N.J. 1993); 
Zurich Ins. Co. v. Northbrook Excess and Surplus Ins. Co., 494 N.E.2d 634, 650 (111. Ct. 
App. 1986); Bazinet v. Concord General Mut. Ins. Co., 513 A.2d 279, 281 (Me. 1986). 
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claim means the policy is never called upon to defend or indemnify, and coverage is not 
provided. See Casualty Indem. Exch. Ins. Co.. 902 F. Supp. at 1239. See also Golden Eagle 
Ins. Corp. v.Cen-Fed. Ltd.. 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 279,148 Cal. App. 4th 976,984 (2007); Garcia 
v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London. 156 P.3d 712, 721 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007); Coastal 
Refining & Marketing. Inc. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.. 218 S.W.3d 279.294 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2007); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Volmar Construction Co.. Inc.. 300 A.D.2d 40, 
42, 752 N.Y.S.2d 286 (2002); American Mut. Liability Ins. Co.. 235 N.W.2d at 774; 
Gribaldo. Jacobs. Jones and Associates v. Agrippina Verisicherunges A.G.. 476 P.2d 406 
(Cal. 1970); Eastman v. United States. 257 F. Supp. 315, 319 (S.D. Ind. 1966). 
Casualty Indem. Exch. Ins. Co. involved contribution claims between two insurers that 
had issued liability policies to a motel where a guest was injured. After the guest filed suit, 
the insured tendered the claim to Casualty Indemnity but not to the other insurer, Liberty 
National. After Casually Indemnity paid the claim it filed a contribution action against 
Liberty National. The court granted summary judgment dismissing Casually Indemnity's 
contribution claim, holding: "where the insured has failed to tender the defense of an action 
to its insurer, the latter is excused from its duty to perform under its policy.. . ." Casualty 
Indem. Exch. Ins. Co., 902 F. Supp. 1235 at (D. Mont. 1995). 
The holding in Casualty Indem. Exch. Ins. Co. is in line with Cincinnati Cos. v. West 
Am. Ins. Co.. 701 N.E.2d 499, 503 (111. 1998). In Cincinnati Cos.. the insurer had actual 
notice of the suit because one defendant had tendered to the insurer, but their insured co-
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defendant had not. After discovering the potential coverage, the co-insurer brought suit for 
equitable contribution. In its decision denying the request for contribution, the court stated: 
The duty to defend falls solely on the selected insurer. That 
insurer may not in turn seek equitable contribution from the 
other insurers who were not designated by the insured. This rule 
is intended to protect the insured's right to knowingly forego an 
insurer's involvement. 
Cincinnati Cos., 701 N.E.2d at 503 (citation omitted). As further noted by the Illinois 
Supreme Court: 
When several insurance policies are available to the insured, that 
insured has the paramount right to choose or knowingly forego 
an insurer's participation in a claim. The insured may choose to 
forego an insurer's assistance for various reasons, including the 
insured's fear that premiums would increase or that the policy 
would be cancelled in the future. Moreover, an insured's ability 
to forego that assistance should be protected. . . . When an 
insured has knowingly chosen to forego an insurer's assistance 
by instructing the insurer not to involve itself in the litigation, 
the insurer is relieved oj its obligation to the insured with 
regard to that claim. The targeted insurer, then, has the sole 
responsibility to defend and indemnify the insured. That insurer 
may not seek equitable contribution from the other insurers that 
were not designated by the insured. 
Legion Ins. Co. v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co.. 822 N.E.2d 1, 4-5 (111. 2004) (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added); see also Employers Ins. v. James McHugh Constr. Co., 144 F.3d 
1097, 1107 (7th Cir. 1998). 
Similarly, in Institute of London Underwriters. 599 N.E.2d 1311 (111. 1992), the court 
concluded that an insured has the right to choose which policy will apply. In that case, the 
Institute of London Underwriters provided coverage to an injured party's employer as a 
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named insured and to the employer's general contractor as an additional insured. A suit was 
filed against the general contractor by the estate of a fatally injured employee, and Institute 
of London accepted tender of this claim from the general contractor. The contractor advised 
its insurer, Hartford, of the pending claim but instructed Hartford not to contribute to the 
defense or indemnification of the action. Institute of London later sued Hartford, seeking 
equitable contribution. Both the circuit court and the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that 
the claim for equitable contribution was defeated by the contractor's instructions to Hartford 
not to defend or indemnify the action. The court held: "if the policy is never triggered, the 
issue of liability under the 'other insurance' clause does not arise.'" Institute of London 
Underwriters, 599 N.E.2d at 1315; see also Bituminous Casualty Corp.. 704 N.E.2d at 796; 
XL Specialty Ins. Co. v. Patrol Helicopters. Inc.. 2009 WL 4929261 (D. Mont. December 21, 
2009), affd. 411 Fed. Appx. 78,2011 WL 182154 (9th Cir. January 20,2011) (holding that 
in the context of equitable contribution, where a claim has not been tendered an insurer is 
excused from its duty to pay. The targeted tender rule bars the claim). 
6
 The underlying facts of Bituminous Casualty are noteworthy. In Bituminous 
Casualty, the primary insurer was brought into the case after its insured advised it of a 
personal injury lawsuit filed against the insured. The insured also advised its secondary 
insurer that it was looking solely to the primary insurer for defense against the lawsuit and 
for compensation in the event of an adverse verdict. Although the insured could also have 
sought protection and compensation from the secondary insurer, it declined to do so. The 
primary insurer eventually settled the case, and thereafter sought partial contribution from 
the secondary insurer pursuant to the "other insurance" clauses present in both policies. The 
primary insurer's subrogation claim was dismissed on summary judgment based upon the 
application of the targeted tender rule. 
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In Truck Ins. Exchange v. Unigard Ins. Co., 79 Cal. App. 4th 966, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
516, (2000), an insurer was asked to contribute to defense and indemnification costs after the 
litigation had ended. The insurer refused to contribute on the grounds that it had not been 
asked to participate in the litigation - by tender of defense or otherwise. The court found that 
it was inequitable to deny control of the defense and then charge the protesting insurer with 
expenses about which it knew nothing. As stated by the court: 
[Unigard Ins. Co's] insured tendered the defense of the. . . cases 
to [Truck Ins. Exchange], not Unigard. Absent tender, it is 
difficult to understand what, if anything, Unigard was supposed 
to do. Although the defense was tendered to, and accepted by, 
Truck, Unigard did not receive notice of its potential liability for 
contribution until after the . . . cases were resolved. Under these 
circumstances, the imposition of contribution on Unigard - a 
stranger to the litigation - would subject it to a significant 
financial burden even though it did not enjoy any of the 
concomitant benefits, e.g., the right to participate in and control 
the defense Truck should not be permitted to drag Unigard 
into the picture after the fact. 
Truck Ins. Exchange v. Unigard Ins. Co.. 79 Cal. App. 4th 966,979,94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 516,525 
(2000) (citations omitted). 
The situation in this appeal is not unlike the authority cited. The targeted insurer, 
WCF, who is displeased with the election of the insured, Pioneer, seeks to effectuate a forced 
tender of the claim to the non-targeted insurer, UBIC. In other words, WCF seeks to trigger 
coverage of the UBIC policy, and forcibly override Pioneer's wishes, by usurping the 
privilege of the insured to decide whether, and to whom, a claim should be tendered. 
However, coverage cannot be triggered by a rival insurer. See, e ^ , Hartford Accident and 
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Indemnity. 776 F.2d at 1383; Bituminous Casualty Corp.. 704 N.E.2d at 79. 
In Hartford Accident and Indemnity, the City of Peoria was insured by Hartford and 
named as an additional insured on Gulfs policy. Hartford Accident and Indemnity, 776 F.2d 
at 1383. The City tendered the claim to Hartford. Id. Ten months later, Hartford's attorney 
asked Gulf to assume the City's defense. LI Gulf refused. Id The Seventh Circuit held 
that the City's defense was not adequately tendered to Gulf because there was no evidence 
that the City ever asked Gulf to defend it. Id. 
Finally, in Mutual of Enumclaw, the Washington Supreme Court also adopted the 
targeted tender rule. In Mutual of Enumclaw, USF Insurance Company ("USF"), Mutual of 
Enumclaw Insurance Company, and Commercial Underwriters Insurance Company 
("CUIC") all insured Dally Homes, Inc., a homebuilder and developer, for a condominium 
development called Windsong Arbor. After completing the development, the Windsong 
Arbor Homeowners' Association sued Dally Homes for construction defects. Dally Homes 
subsequently tendered the claim to Mutual of Enumclaw and CUIC, but not to USF. Mutual 
of Enumclaw and CUIC later brought an action for contribution and subrogation against 
USF, claiming it should share in the costs as a co-insurer. The trial court adopted the 
targeted tender rule, but the Washington Court of Appeals reversed. USF appealed to the 
Washington Supreme Court. 
The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the insured, 
Dally Homes, had the right to selectively tender the claim. The court based its decision on 
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the fact that USF had no legal obligation to pay the claim because Dally Homes never 
tendered the claim to it. The court concluded: "In sum, because Dally [Homes] chose not to 
tender to USF, USF had no legal obligation to defend or indemnify Dally [Homes] at the time 
of the settlement. Accordingly, we hold that [Mutual of Enumclaw] and CUIC do not have 
a right to equitable contribution from USF." Mutual of Enumclaw. 191 P.3d at 874.7 
In this instance, Pioneer has clearly and unequivocally foregone the assistance of its 
insurer, UBIC, and no other insurer should be permitted to force UBIC to pay the claim. On 
the undisputed facts of this case, Pioneer elected not to enforce its contractual insurance 
policy rights by choosing not to provide notice of the claim to its insurer, UBIC. R. 346. In 
October of 2010, Pioneer unequivocally reaffirmed its intention to selectively tender the 
claim to WCF and that UBIC should not get involved. R. 346. The salient part of Pioneer's 
instruction to UBIC is seen as follows: 
The claim involving the injury to Russ Antone was filed in 
7
 Note that the court also underscored the role of the insured in tendering the claim by 
distinguishing claims of equitable contribution from subrogation claims. In the context of 
equitable contribution, an insured retains the right to selectively tender the claim. However, 
where an insurer is able to stand in the shoes of the insured, the insurer is then able to tender 
the claim, notwithstanding the targeted tender rule. Thus, "an insurer who receives full 
contractual assignment of an insured's rights may bring a conventional subrogation claim to 
enforce those rights." Mutual of Enumclaw. 191 P.3d at 875. In this case, which is of the 
equitable subrogation variety, there are no facts to support a tender by WCF to UBIC on 
behalf of Pioneer. 
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March 2008 while we were insured with WCF and in the 
process of writing insurance with UBIC. It was always our 
intention to have this claim paid through WCF. We had paid 
into the WCF for many years. We do not want to get UBIC 
involved in this claim. 
R.346. 
Tendering a claim is a necessary and crucial prerequisite to an insurer's duty to 
provide coverage. Accordingly, in the absence of a tender, as in this case, there is no duty 
on the part of the insurer to cover the claim. The simple fact is that WCF is attempting to 
compel UBIC to cover a claim that was never tendered to it by Pioneer - effectively creating 
a "forced tender" against Pioneer's wishes. The authority cited herein demonstrates that 
WCF's attempt to tender a claim to another insurer is invalid. 
The targeted tender rule has sound policy underpinnings that justify its adoption in 
Utah. Foremost of these justifications is that the rule preserves an insured's right to choose 
whether to invoke, or not to invoke, the terms of its insurance contracts. An insured may 
choose not to tender a claim to its insurer for a variety of reasons. An insured may choose 
not to tender a claim in order to avoid a premium increase; it may want to preserve its policy 
limits for other claims; it may want to safeguard its relationship with its current insurer; or 
it may simply elect not to tender the claim because of a bad experience on a prior claim. 
Whatever its reasons, an insured has the right not to tender to its insurer. Allowing forced 
contribution defeats that right. It allows another insurer, who is not a party to the insurance 
contract, to decide on behalf of the insured whether a claim must be tendered. It forces an 
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insured to be force-fed the consequences it sought to avoid by not tendering the claim. An 
insured must have the right when more than one insurer's policy potentially covers a loss to 
seek or not to seek an insurer's participation in a claim as the insured chooses. This right to 
elect does not change merely because the claim is made under workers compensation 
insurance. "[A]n insured's ability to forgo that assistance should be protected." Cincinnati 
Cos.. 701 N.E.2d at 503 (citation omitted); Garcia. 156 P.3d 712 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007) 
(insured may decline a defense, and the insurer's duty is relieved). 
The targeted tender rule is also not a right that is prohibited in the policies at issue. 
There is no provision in either WCF's policy or UBIC's policy that requires Pioneer to tender 
the claim to all available insurers. R. 9-16,204-231. The best, and only, argument WCF has 
is that the "other insurance" clause somehow requires a tender. However, the case law cited 
herein clearly provides that an "other insurance" clause is only applicable where multiple 
policies are available to pay the loss. A policy is only available to pay a loss where the 
insured has tendered a claim under that policy. The result is that a tender to one carrier is not 
a tender to all carriers, and where no tender is made by the insured, an "other insurance" 
clause is ineffective in forcing the carrier to whom no tender was made to share in the loss. 
Here, there was one tender by Pioneer - the tender to WCF. It is undisputed that Pioneer 
never tendered the claim to UBIC. R. 126. Absent clearly contrary and controlling language 
in a policy that requires an insured to tender a claim to all insurers that may potentially 
provide coverage, if an insured, such as Pioneer, is covered by two insurance policies, but 
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tenders the claim to only one of the insurers, that right to choose should be upheld. To hold 
otherwise requires a finding that an insurer has a greater right than an insured to determine 
whether a claim should be tendered to another insurer - a conclusion that finds no legal 
support. 
j * Admittedly, the targeted tender rule has only been adopted by a few jurisdictions. The 
factual circumstances giving rise to the doctrine - a tender by an insured under a contract to 
fewer than all available insurers - rarely arise. Nevertheless, the doctrine has been 
unanimously approved by those jurisdictions that have considered it. It is, therefore, 
improper to label the targeted tender doctrine a minority position. 
Finally, the fact that workers compensation coverage is required in Utah, or that the 
Labor Commission's website reflects dual coverage in this case, are red herrings that are 
irrelevant to the targeted tender issue. UBIC admits that workers compensation coverage is 
required in Utah. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-201 (2008). UBIC also admits that, solely 
for purposes of the targeted tender issue, dual coverage was in place on March 21, 2008 -
the date Mr. Antone was injured. However, the fact that dual coverage was in place does not 
obligate Pioneer to tender to both insurers, nor does the requirement for coverage allow WCF 
to tender the claim to UBIC. There is no authority for such propositions. Like the factual 
scenario presented in every case cited herein where the targeted tender rule was adopted, dual 
coverage for a loss was the prerequisite to allowing an insured to choose to tender the claim 
to none, some, or all of its insurers. This case is no different in this regard. Dual coverage 
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was in place on the date of injury, and Pioneer retained its paramount right to elect to whom 
to tender the claim, notwithstanding the requirement for coverage. Pioneer, as the 
policyholder, paid the premiums on both policies, and is uniquely positioned to determine 
whether to make a claim under one of its policies. No contractual provision in either policy 
granted WCF the right to tender a claim on behalf of the insured. Simply put, the fact that 
this is a workers compensation case is irrelevant. 
Based upon the undisputed fact that Pioneer tendered the claim to WCF and not to 
UBIC, only the WCF policy was triggered by Pioneer and, therefore, only the WCF policy 
should bear the cost of the Antone claim. Under such circumstances, the order of the district 
court should be reversed and judgment entered in favor of UBIC. 
3. WCF is not a third-party beneficiary of the insurance contract between 
UBIC and Pioneer. 
The targeted tender rule is a doctrine firmly rooted in common law contract principles. 
Insurance contracts are private contracts between the parties. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. 
v. Wiscomb. 643 P.2d 441, 445 (Wash. 1982). Like other contracts, the rights and 
obligations of an insurance contract may only be enforced by the parties to the agreement or 
an intended beneficiary. See Wagner v. Clifton. 62 P.3d 440,441-42 (Utah 2002); Benjamin 
v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co.. 2006 UT 37.140P.3d 1210,1213 (Utah 2006) ("An insurance policy 
is merely a contract between the insured and the insurer."); Alf v. State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Co.. 850 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah 1993); 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 421 (1991). "The 
benefits conferred by contracts are presumed to flow exclusively to the parties who sign the 
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contracts." Bvbee v. Abdulla. 2008 UT 35, 189 P.3d 40, 49 (2008) (citing Tracv Collins 
Bank & Trust v. Dickamore. 652 P.2d 1314,1315-16 (Utah 1982)): see also Allstate Ins. Co. 
v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 619 P.2d 329, 334 (Utah 1980); Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 302 (1981); Alcan United Inc. v. West Bent Mut. Ins. Co., 707 N.E.2d 687,695 
(111. 1999). Only under circumstances where the contract "clearly intended to confer a 
separate and distinct benefit upon the third party" can it be enforced by a third-party 
beneficiary. Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur.. 854 P.2d 527, 536 (Utah 1993). It follows 
that, in the absence of a intended third-party beneficiary, the insurer and the insured, as 
parties to the contract, are the only parties free to choose whether or not to enforce the 
contract. To allow a co-insurer - a stranger to the contract - to enforce the terms of the 
insurance policy would effectively create third-party beneficiary rights where none were 
intended by the contracting parties. In this regard, the United States District Court for the 
District of Montana has stated: 
The right of an insurer to contribution from a coinsurer exists 
when both insurers are liable for the loss; a situation which can 
only arise when the obligation of both insurers under their 
respective policies are 'triggered'. Otherwise, if the doctrine of 
equitable contribution were applied to a coinsurer for a claim 
never tendered by the insured to that coinsurer, the insurance 
policy becomes, in effect, a third-party beneficiary contract 
enter ed into by the insured for the direct benefit oj other carriers. 
Such a rule would be 'inequitable' in that it would require an 
insurer to reimburse another carrier for a claim it has no 
obligation to pay to its insured and in circumvention of the 
insurer's wishes with whom it has the contract. 
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Casualty Indem. Exch. Ins. Co.. 902 F. Supp. at 1239 fh. 4 (D. Mont. 1995) (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added); Maryland Cas. Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co.. 218 F.3d 204,210-211 
(2d Cir. 2000); Signal Cos.. Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co.. 27 Cal. 3d 359,369,612 P.2d 889 (1980) 
("The reciprocal rights and duties of several insurers who have covered the same event do 
not arise out of contract, for their agreements are not with each other.") (quoting Am. Auto. 
Ins. Co. v. Seaboard Sur. Co.. 155 Cal. App. 2d 192, 195-96,318 P.2d 84 (1957)). 
In this case, Pioneer entered into an insurance contact with UBIC, and WCF was not 
a party or an intended beneficiary of that contract. R. 203-231. WCF, therefore, cannot force 
UBIC to pay a claim that Pioneer specifically instructed UBIC not to pay. Moreover, WCF 
cannot argue that the "other insurance" clause is a gateway for it to tender a claim under the 
UBIC policy. Only an insured can tender a claim to its insurer, and no tender was made by 
Pioneer to UBIC. UBIC, therefore, has no obligation to pay the claim. Pioneer exercised its 
paramount right not to invoke coverage under its contract of insurance with UBIC, and WCF 
cannot exercise those rights on Pioneer's behalf. Equity cannot circumvent the wishes of the 
insured to create contractual obligations in a policy that was never triggered by the insured. 
The order of the district court should be reversed and judgment entered in favor of UBIC. 
B. Granting WCF's motion for partial summary judgment was premature, and the 
case should be remanded for further discovery. 
Assuming, arguendo, the targeted tender rule is not adopted by this Court, the case 
should nevertheless be remanded for further discovery. In its order, the district court 
concluded that further factual discovery would be "unnecessary" and "irrelevant under the 
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parol evidence rule." R. 381. This erroneous conclusion was reached by ignoring the liberal 
standards by which Rule 56(f) motions are judged; by ignoring applicable Utah case law; and 
by concluding that sufficient time had been provided for discovery, when the reality was that 
UBIC was forced to prematurely prove its case. As will be demonstrated below, the district 
court abused its discretion in denying UBIC's request for additional discovery. 
URCP 56(f) provides: 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the 
motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court 
may refuse the application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to 
be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as 
is just. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f) (2011) 
Under Utah law, "summary judgment should not be granted if discovery is incomplete 
since information sought in discovery may create genuine issues of material fact sufficient 
to defeat the motion." Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman. 740 P.2d 275, 278 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987). "An important objective of rule 56(f) is to ensure that a diligent party has been 
provided adequate opportunity for discovery." Brown v. Glover, 16 P.3d 540 (Utah 2000) 
(citing Price Dev. Co.. L.P. v. Orem City. 2000 UT 26, H 30,995 P.2d 1237 (2000)); see also 
10B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Civil § 2740 (3d ed. 1998) ("The purpose of [Rule 56(f)] is to provide an 
additional safeguard against an improvident or premature grant of summary judgment... and 
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[the rule] should be applied with a spirit of liberality."). "A rule 56(f) motion has merit when 
it targets core issues that might defeat the pending summary judgment motion." Energy 
Management Services. L.L.C. v. Shaw. 110 P.3d 158,161 (Utah Ct.App. 2005); see also Salt 
Lake County v. Western Dairymen Coop.. Inc.. 2002 UT 39,f 24,48 P.3d 910 (2002) (stating 
that a motion for a continuance does not lack merit when it "requests] an opportunity to 
continue with factual exploration on an issue that could [defeat a] summary judgment 
motion"). 
A reviewing court analyzes a trial court's denial of a Rule 56(f) motion by applying 
the "limits of reasonability" standard set forth in Crossland Sav.. 877 P.2d at 1243-44. It is 
not a bright-line test for determining whether the trial court abused its discretion; rather, it 
is a test that is based upon the specific circumstances of each case. In Overstock.com. Inc. 
v. SmartBargains. Inc.. 2008 UT 55,192 P.3d 858 (2008), a non-exhaustive list of relevant 
considerations was provided by the Utah Supreme Court to determine whether a Rule 56(f) 
motion should be granted. These are: 
(1) an examination of the party's rule 56(f) affidavit to determine 
whether the discovery sought will uncover disputed material 
facts that will prevent the grant of summary judgment or if the 
party requesting discovery is simply on a "fishing expedition," 
(2) whether the party opposing the summary judgment motion 
has had adequate time to conduct discovery and has been 
conscientious in pursuing such discovery, and (3) the diligence 
of the party moving for summary judgment in responding to the 
discovery requests provided by the party opposing summary 
judgment. 
Page 35 of 49 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Id, 2008 UT 55,121,192 P.3d at 865; see also Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co.. 745 P.2d 
838, 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Cox v. Winters. 678 P.2d 311, 312-314 (Utah 1984). In 
applying these and all other relevant factors dictated by the facts of the case, courts generally 
construe Rule 56(f) liberally in favor of the requesting party to allow for adequate discovery, 
unless the request is "dilatory or lacking in merit." Energy Management Services. 110 P.3d 
at 160 (citing Western Dairymen. 2002 UT 39,f 24,48 P.3d 910); Reeves v. Geigy Pharm.. 
Inc.. 764 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 106 
S. Ct. 2548, 2554-55 (1986) (premature summary judgment motions can be dealt with by 
applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) to allow for additional time to conduct necessary discovery). 
While dilatory behavior will vary from one case to the next, the conclusions of several 
courts regarding what constitutes dilatory behavior are instructive. See, e ^ , Jensen v. Smith. 
163 P.2d 657,658 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (concluding that two and a half years from inception 
of the lawsuit to the filing of the motion for summary judgment was sufficient time to 
conduct discovery); Overstock.com. 2008 UT 55,192 P.3d at 866 (concluding that two years 
in which to conduct discovery was sufficient for Overstock to conduct discovery); Crossland 
Sav.. 877 P.2d at 1243-44 (Rule 56(f) motion denied because no discovery was initiated by 
the party seeking a continuance). As summarized by one court: "a party's rule 56(f) motion 
for a continuance is not dilatory if the party has already initiated discovery proceedings, 
diligently seeks access to information that is within the sole control of the adverse party, and 
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is denied an adequate opportunity to conduct the desired discovery." Western Dairymen. 
2002UT39,48P.3dat917. 
Like Salt Lake County in Western Dairymen. UBIC had initiated discovery procedures 
and intended to pursue additional factual exploration. In both cases, the Rule 56(f) affidavit 
stated that additional discovery time was needed for a particular issue. The Western 
Dairymen court concluded that, while a bright-line could not be applied, two months was 
insufficient to conduct discovery. The court reasoned that the County did not have enough 
time to "read the responses to its interrogatories, analyze the documents it received, and then 
determine who should be deposed and what questions should be asked. Additionally, it had 
to schedule a date to take the depositions... [which] required accommodating the schedules 
of not only the deponents but at least two attorneys as well." Id. at 918. There was simply 
to little time - only two months - to perform the tasks vital to the County's case 
development. 
Similarly, there was insufficient time to conduct discovery in this case. Initial 
disclosures were exchanged on December 3, 2010, and WCF filed its motion for partial 
summary judgment on March 11,2011. R. 40-46,53-55. During these three, short, holiday-
filled months, the parties only exchanged one set of discovery requests, and UBIC was still 
awaiting responses to its discovery requests from WCF when the motion for summary 
judgment was filed. R. 50,160-61. Like Salt Lake County, UBIC was still evaluating the 
information it had gathered to determine who should be deposed and what questions should 
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be asked. However, before UBIC could take any depositions, and before UBIC even had the 
chance to discover the evidence necessary to support its defenses, WCF filed its motion for 
summary judgment. By denying the Rule 56(f) motion, the court improperly forced UBIC 
to prematurely prove its case. This was the precise issue that Rule 56(f) was designed to 
avoid. UBIC was not dilatory in pursuing discovery. 
In addition, UBIC's Rule 56(f) affidavit was meritorious. UBIC's affidavit made 
clear that it sought to conduct additional written discovery and to take depositions with 
regard to several issues, including the intent of the parties and the negotiations that drove the 
procurement of the 2008 policy. R. 154-56. The discovery UBIC sought to conduct was 
central to proving UBIC's defenses of mutual mistake and reformation of the 2008 policy. 
UBIC's affidavit identified discoverable issues that would have precluded the granting of 
WCF's motion. The argument that these factual issues would be proven by parol evidence 
is irrelevant. See, e.g.. West One Trust Company v. Morrison, 861 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993); Warner v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d 666,669 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Robert 
Langston Ltd. v. McOuarrie, 741 P.2d 554, 557 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)); Grahn v. Gregory. 
800 P.2d 320, 327 n. 8 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Mabev v. Kav Peterson Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 
287, 290 (Utah 1984); Jensen v. Manila Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints, 565 P.2d 63,64 (Utah 1977) (citing Sine v. Harper, 118 Utah415,429,222 P.2d 571, 
578-79 (1950)) (each holding that parol evidence is admissible to show mutual mistake). 
Extrinsic evidence of mutual mistake may be used to reform a contract, including an 
Page 38 of 49 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
insurance policy. See, e.g.. Hess v. Ford Motor Co.. 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 220,27 Cal. 4th 516, 
525 (2002) ("It is the rule that, where the writing itself, through mistake, does not express 
the intention of the parties who entered into i t . . . and the writing does not therefore contain 
the real contract between the parties, the objection as to parol evidence is without merit."); 
Leamington Co. v. Nonprofits' Ins. Ass'n.. 615 N.W.2d 349, 354 (Minn. 2000); Rvan v. 
Mountain States Helicopter. Inc.. 686 P.2d 95, 99 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984); Simon v. Truck 
Insurance Exchange. 757 P.2d 1123 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Shaw v. Aetna Cas. & Ins. Co.. 
262 S.E.2d903 (S.C. 1980): Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wall. 249 S.E.2d 
588 (Ga. 1978); Niagara Fire Insurance Co. v. Allied Electrical Co.. 319 So.2d 594 (Fla. Ct. 
App.1975); Coal Operators Cas. Co. v. F.S. Neelv Co.. 243 S.W.2d 744 (Ark. 1951); 
Lumberman's Ins. Co. v. Heiner. 245 P.2d 415 (Ariz. 1952); Prudential Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Stanley. 131 P.2d 88 (Okla. 1942). The discovery UBIC sought to conduct, but was 
precluded from conducting by the premature granting of summary judgment, went to the very 
heart of UBIC' s defense of mutual mistake and reformation. 
UBICs conduct was not dilatory and its Rule 56(f) affidavit was meritorious. UBIC 
was only requesting the chance to conduct additional discovery to prove its defenses. 
UBICs Rule 56(f) Affidavit made clear that no depositions had been taken, and that 
additional written discovery was contemplated regarding "The intent of the parties and the 
scope of the negotiations at the time the 2008 policy was procured from UBIC." R. 155. It 
was an abuse of discretion to grant WCF's motion for summary judgment in the face of 
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UBIC's 56(f) motion. The order of the district court should be reversed and the case 
remanded to allow the parties to conduct additional discovery. 
C. The trial court erred in concluding that as a matter of law, UBIC was prohibited 
from introducing parol evidence regarding the intent of Pioneer and UBIC with 
respect to the 2008 policy. 
In granting WCF's motion for summary judgment so early in the discovery process, 
UBIC's efforts to discover the information necessary to prove its defenses were stifled. At 
the same time, the court also concluded that, as a matter of law, UBIC could not introduce 
parol evidence of the parties' intent to support its defense of mutual mistake. This 
conclusion was reached by the trial court in spite of the uncontroverted affidavit of John 
Stout, owner of Pioneer, wherein Mr. Stout affirmed that he "never intended to have 
overlapping workers' compensation insurance coverage." R. 126. At the very least, Mr. 
Stout's affidavit created a material issue of fact that could not be resolved on summary 
judgment. As will be demonstrated below, the district court's conclusion was erroneous. 
1. Parol evidence is admissible to show mutual mistake. 
A "mistake" in the context of an insurance contract is a belief which is not consistent 
with the facts surrounding the risk and/or issuance of the policy. See 2 Couch on Insurance 
§ 27:2. A mistake is mutual where the parties have agreed to accomplish something by a 
contract, and the contract ineffectively or incompletely accomplishes that objective. Mabey, 
682 P.2d at 290. Numerous Utah courts have admitted parol evidence to show that the 
writing did not conform to the intent of the parties. See, e.g., Manila Corp., 565 P.2d at 64 
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(citing Sine, 118 Utah at 429,222 P.2d at 578-79); Grahn, 800 P.2d at 327 n. 8. 
Most applicable to the case before this Court is the case of West One Trust Company 
v. Morrison. 861 P.2d 1058 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In that case, three properties were 
conveyed by warranty deeds to Merlin Morrison Sr. ("Sr.") and Merlin Morrison Jr. ("Jr.") 
as joint tenants. Upon Sr.'s death, the personal representative of Sr.'s estate, West One, 
argued that the properties were held in a partnership, which dissolved upon Sr.'s death. 
Accordingly, West One argued, full ownership did not vest entirely in Jr. upon Sr.'s death; 
rather, each owned a one-half interest in the properties. 
At trial, West One argued that the deeds did not demonstrate the parties' true intent, 
and that the joint tenancy designation was a mistake. Jr., on the other hand, argued that the 
deeds were unambiguous on their face, and that the trial court could not look beyond the four 
corners of the documents. The trial court adopted the argument advanced by Jr. and West 
One appealed. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. The court began with the general rule that 
"when a writing is unambiguous, extrinsic evidence will ordinarily not be allowed to vary 
the terms of the writing." Id at 1061 (citing Sparrow v. Tayco Constr. Co., 846 P.2d 1323, 
1327 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The court then articulated the exceptions to the rule: 
Exceptions to the parol evidence rule exist, however, when there 
is an issue as to whether the parties intended the writing as an 
integrated contract, and when what appears to be a complete and 
binding integrated agreement . . . may be voidable for fraud, 
duress, mistake or the like, or it may be illegal. Such 
invalidating causes need not and commonly do not appear on the 
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face of the writing. Therefore, parol evidence may be 
admissible to show mutual mistake, occurring when both parties, 
at the time of contracting, share a misconception about a basic 
assumption or vital fact upon which they based their bargain. 
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
After noting that a joint tenancy agreement is subject to reformation on the basis of 
mutual mistake, the court concluded that "parol evidence is admissible to demonstrate that 
a mutual mistake resulted in a document which does not accurately reflect the intent of the 
parties." Id The court then stated that it was reversible error by the trial court to preclude 
the introduction of extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent. Id "A motion for summary 
judgment may not be granted if.. . there is a factual issue as to what the parties intended." 
Id at 1062 (quoting Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104,108 (Utah 1991)). 
Significantly, the court also made clear that the question of whether the agreement 
should actually be reformed is a subsequent inquiry to the issue of introducing extrinsic 
evidence. After concluding that parol evidence is admissible, the court noted that if mutual 
mistake is established by clear and convincing evidence, only then may the document be 
reformed. Id 
Here, the trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that parol evidence could not be 
introduced based upon the clear and unambiguous nature of the 2008 policy. R. 378-385. 
However, this was the precise argument that was raised, and rejected, in the West One case. 
Like the trial court in the West One case, the trial court in this case prohibited the 
introduction of extrinsic evidence that could have demonstrated the intent of Pioneer and 
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UBIC with respect to the 2008 policy. Such a conclusion was erroneous. At a minimum, 
UBIC should have been granted the opportunity to introduce evidence of the parties' intent. 
Only then could the trial court determine the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to 
reformation. The order of the district court should be reversed and the case remanded. 
2. Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-205 does not make UBIC liable as a matter 
of law, 
WCF argued to the trial judge, and the trial court ordered, that UBIC should be liable 
as a matter of law under § 34A-2-205, and that to allow an insurance company to present any 
defense with regard to coverage would corrupt the workers compensation system. R. 378-
385,414. In other words, regardless of how blatant the mistake or the underlying facts to the 
contrary, if the Labor Commission's database indicates that coverage was in place, Section 
34A-2-205 prohibits the introduction of any evidence to contradict or to explain this mistake. 
This radical argument cannot be accepted. 
In 2008, Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-205( 1) provided: 
(a) An insurance carrier writing workers' compensation 
insurance coverage in this state or for this state, regardless of the 
state in which the policy is written, shall file notification of that 
coverage with the division or its designee within 30 days after 
the inception date of the policy in the form prescribed by the 
division. 
(b) A policy described in Subsection (l)(a) is in effect from 
inception until canceled by filing with the division or its 
designee a notification of cancellation in the form prescribed by 
the division within ten days after the cancellation of a policy. 
(c) Failure to notify the division or its designee under 
Subsection (l)(b) will result in the continued liability of the 
carrier until the date that notice of cancellation is received by the 
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division or its designee. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-205 (2008). 
UBIC does not dispute the intent of this section or the numerous circumstances where 
this statute may be applied in favor of finding coverage. However, there is nothing within 
§ 34A-2-205 that prohibits the introduction of defenses to coverage. At best, the strongest 
conclusion that can be drawn is that the statute provides a rebutable presumption of coverage 
that may be refuted by the carrier through the introduction of evidence to the contrary. 
This conclusion is consistent with the analysis applied by the Labor Commission. In 
Zavala v. Prestwich Lumber Co. et aL Utah Labor Commission Case No. 99-0339 (April 30, 
2001), Mr. Zavala was injured on May 7, 1998. The parties in Zavala did not dispute that 
Mr. Zavala was entitled to workers compensation benefits; the only question was whether 
Liberty Mutual had coverage on the date of injury, or whether the Uninsured Employers' 
Fund must step in and pay workers compensation benefits on the employer's behalf. The 
parties jointly paid benefits to Mr. Zavala pending the resolution of the dispute. The Labor 
Commission records showed that Liberty Mutual provided workers compensation coverage 
effective May 2,1998, but Liberty Mutual claimed that coverage began May 11,1998. The 
issue, as stated by the Labor Commission, was as follows: "Pursuant to § 34A-2-205 of the 
[Workers Compensation Act], is Liberty Mutual liable for Mr. Zavala's workers' 
compensation benefits solely on the grounds that Liberty Mutual notified the commission it 
was Mr. Zavala's insurance carrier?" 
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The Administrative Law Judge concluded that "regardless of the parties' actual intent 
or any other considerations, Liberty Mutual's notice to the Labor Commission of the May 2, 
1998 coverage date results in Liberty Mutual's absolute liability for Mr. Zavala's workers' 
compensation benefits." Id. at p.2. 
On appeal, the Labor Commission refused to affirm the finding of the ALJ, and 
remanded the case pending the outcome of the related district court case.8 The Labor 
Commission noted that it could not say Liberty Mutual was absolutely liable as a matter of 
law under § 34A-2-205. IcL The Labor Commission also acknowledged that there may be 
situations where, in spite of Section 205, coverage will not necessarily automatically be 
inferred. Id. "Any such determination requires additional findings of fact." Id. 
Additional fact-finding is the only relief sought by UBIC with respect to this issue. 
At the outset of the case, without any depositions and very little written discovery, UBIC was 
confronted with WCF's motion for summary judgment. UBIC raised its defenses and argued 
that Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f) should preclude the granting of WCF's motion. However, UBIC 
was unreasonably denied the opportunity to conduct discovery to prove its defenses. There 
8
 Because the Labor Commission is a court of only limited jurisdiction, it does not 
have the authority to decide coverage disputes where issues of contract interpretation may 
arise. The ALJ decided the issue on the basis of UEF's argument that § 34A-2-205 allows 
the Labor Commission to decide the issue without reference to the district court proceedings. 
Upon deciding that additional factual findings were required, the Labor Commission deferred 
to the district court case to allow such findings to be made. The district court (United 
Staffing Alliance v. Jaime Zavala, Case No. 000906043, Third Judicial District), ultimately 
ruled in favor of UEF; however, such a ruling properly occurred only after the parties were 
allowed to present evidence at trial. 
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was a material issue of fact - the commencement of coverage for the UBIC policy - and, 
unlike the well-reasoned course that the Zavala case took (both before the Labor Commission 
and the district court) in allowing factual discovery, the district court in this case ignored this 
material issue of fact to reach its conclusion that WCFs motion for summary judgment 
should be granted. However, this material issue of fact cannot be decided as a matter of law, 
and certainly cannot be decided by only applying section 34A-2-205. A court cannot decide 
the coverage dispute in this case as a matter of law because of the factual issues raised 
regarding commencement of the UBIC policy. The granting of WCFs motion was not only 
premature, but it was improper. Section 34A-2-205 does not automatically foreclose a 
party's right to defend a claim. The order of the district court should be reversed and the case 
remanded for further factual discovery. 
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VII. 
CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated above, the targeted tender rule has sound legal and policy 
underpinnings that justify its adoption in Utah. The targeted tender rule recognizes that an 
insured has a paramount right to choose whether, and to whom, to tender a claim. No insured 
should be forced into tendering a claim, nor should an insured's wishes be trumped by 
another insurer. The undisputed reality of this case is that Pioneer never tendered the claim 
to UBIC and, therefore, UBIC was not legally obligated to pay the claim. In the context of 
the "other insurance" clause, the UBIC policy was "unavailable". Understanding that the 
UBIC policy is not available to pay this claim - pursuant to the explicit and written directives 
of Pioneer - it is clear that UBIC cannot be ordered by WCF to pay Mr. Antone's claim 
pursuant to the "other insurance" clause. The order of the district court should be reversed 
and judgment entered in favor of UBIC. 
Alternatively, the case should be remanded to allow for additional factual discovery. 
UBIC was forced to prematurely prove its defenses in response to WCF's motion for 
summary judgment. Despite the fact that very little discovery had been conducted, and no 
depositions taken, the district court refused to grant UBIC's Rule 56(f) motion or to deny the 
motion and allow UBIC to introduce parol evidence in support of its defense of mutual 
mistake. These denials by the district court were erroneous. UBIC's Rule 56(f) affidavit 
justified the additional time for discovery; Utah law also is clear with regard to introducing 
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parol evidence: it may be introduced to show mutual mistake. UBIC should be granted the 
opportunity to conduct discovery. 
4L 
Respectfully submitted this \-J "day of December, 2011. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
Micl 
Scott R. Taylor 
Attorneys for Utah Business Insurance Company 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN f 7 2011 
SALT LAKt ooui* i Y 
B y _ ' ^ 
Deputy CleriT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 100914170 
vs. : 
UTAH BUSINESS INSURANCE COMPANY, : 
Defendant. : 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on June 15, 2 011, in 
connection with the parties' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement to 
further consider the parties' written submissions, the relevant legal 
authorities and counsel's oral argument. Being now fully informed, the 
Court rules as stated herein. 
This is a declaratory judgment case where the plaintiff and the 
defendant provided overlapping workers' compensation coverage to Pioneer 
Roofing Company ("Pioneer") for the period of February 22, 2008, through 
April 1, 2008. On March 21, 2008, Pioneer's employee Russell Antone was 
"catastrophically injured." Workers Compensation Fund (nWCF") has 
continuously paid the weekly compensation and medical expenses to Mr. 
Antone. 
WCF's Motion for Summary Judgment seeks to have this Court apply the 
twin "Other Insurance" clauses in the two workers' compensation insurance 
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WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
V. UTAH BUSINESS INSURANCE PAGE 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
policies, thus holding Utah Business Insurance Company (nUBIC") 
responsible for one-half of the WCF benefits paid to Mr. Antone. These 
clauses provide that where other insurance exists, the insurer will pay 
its pro-rata share of the loss. 
WCF also points to Utah Code Ann., § 34A-2-205(b), which provides 
that u [a] workers' compensation policy is in effect from inception until 
canceled . . . . * Further, under Subparagraph (c) of that statute, 
* [f ] ailure to notify the division [of cancellation] . . . results in 
continued liability of the carrier." WCF argues that this statute sets 
forth a standard of continuing coverage and evidences a legislative 
intent to protect injured workers by holding insurance carriers 
responsible for coverage until formal cancellation. 
UBIC's Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment relies on the selective 
or targeted tender doctrine. Under this doctrine, an insured who is 
covered by multiple insurance policies may designate which of the 
insurers will provide coverage. In this case, Pioneer did not tender a 
claim to UBIC. UBIC's position is that Pioneer's wishes should be 
respected and the targeted tender doctrine applied to make WCF solely 
responsible for Mr. Antone's benefits. 
After considering the parties' respective legal positions, the Court 
declines to apply the targeted tender doctrine in this case. This 
doctrine has never been adopted in Utah and has never been applied in a 
workers' compensation insurance coverage case by the handful of other 
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WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
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jurisdictions which have applied this doctrine. Overall, the Court rules 
that this doctrine represents a minority position which runs counter to 
§ 34A-2-205 and the legislative intent evidenced by this statute. 
Therefore, UBIC's Motion seeking to apply this doctrine is denied. 
The Court further rules that the UBIC policy was effective 
beginning on February 22, 2008. Further factual discovery on this point 
is unnecessary and, indeed, would be irrelevant under the parol evidence 
rule. The UBIC policy is clear and unambiguous that the effective date 
of the policy commenced on February 22, 2008, a date which is repeated 
some thirty times in the policy. UBIC will not be allowed to present 
extraneous evidence to alter this plain language. Further, UBIC has 
failed to present any legal or factual support for its premise of mutual 
mistake and the applicability of contractual reformation, particularly 
in this context of workers' compensation coverage. 
Next, under § 34A-2-205, the Court rules that the February 22, 2 008, 
UBIC policy is active and covers Mr. Antone's March 21, 2008, industrial 
injury. UBIC has not issued a notification of cancellation of the 2008 
policy. Further, its filing of a second policy with the Industrial 
Commission does not negate the effective date of the February 22, 2008, 
policy, which remained active from its inception and provided continuous 
coverage under § 34A-2-205, including on the date of Mr. Antone's injury. 
That leads the Court to its final ruling, namely that UBIC is 
contractually responsible under the twin "Other Insurance" provisions for 
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its pro-rata share of Mr. Antone's claim. Pioneer's tender of this claim 
to WCF rather than UBIC is irrelevant. Accordingly, WCF's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is granted and UBIC's counter-Motion for Summary 
Judgment is denied in the entirety. 
Counsel for WCF is to prepare an Order consistent with this 
Memorandum Decision and submit the same to the Court for review and 
signature. 
Dated this / / day of June, 2011. 
PAUL (K MAUG. 
DISTRICT COUR' 
By 
STAMP : i^ rr 
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SALT LMfcCOUNTY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
UTAH BUSINESS INSURANCE 
COMPANY 
Defendant 
ORDER GRANTING PLATNTD7F 
WORKERS COMPENSATION 




and DENYING DEFENDANT 
UTAH BUSINESS INSURANCE 
COMPANY'S "COUNTER-
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT" 
Civil Case No. 100914170 
Judge Maughan 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on June 15,2011. At issue are plaintiff 
Workers Compensation Fund's ("WCF") "Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding 
'Other Insurance'" and defendant Utah Business Insurance Company's ("UBIC") "Counter-
Motion for Summary Judgment." Having considered the cross motions for summary judgment 
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and legal arguments of the parties, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision dated June 17, 
2011, which the Court incorporates herein by reference. The Court finds the following facts: 
UNCOIVTROVERTED MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Pioneer Roofing Company, Inc. ("Pioneer") maintained a workers compensation insurance 
policy with WCF from April 1, 2007 to April 1, 2008. 
2. Pioneer maintained a workers compensation insurance policy with UBIC from February 
22,2008 to February 22, 2009. 
3. WCF and UBIC provided overlapping and concurrent workers compensation insurance 
coverage for Pioneer from February 22,2008 to April 1,2008. 
4. During the period of UBIC's and WCF's overlapping insurance coverage, Pioneer 
employee Russell Antone ("Antone") was catastrophically injured on March 21,2008 while in 
the course and scope of his employment with Pioneer. 
5. The National Council on Compensation Insurance ("NCCI") authors workers 
compensation form contracts adopted by the Utah Insurance Department. Both WCF's standard 
policy and UBICs standard policy contain the following "other insurance" clause: 
R Other Insurance 
We will not pay more than our share of benefits and costs covered by this 
insurance and other insurance or self insurance. Subject to any limits of liability 
that may apply, all shares will be equal until the loss is paid. If any insurance is 
exhausted, the shares of all remaining insurance will be equal until the loss is 
paid. 
6. WCF has adjusted and paid all medical expenses and weekly compensation 
benefits to which Mr. Antone is entitled by the Workers Compensation Act1 to date. 
!See Utah Code Annotated §34A-2-101 et seq. 
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT ISSUES 
A* WCF's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
WCF asked the Court in its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for the following 
rulings of declaratory relief and partial summary judgment: 
1. The twin workers' compensation insurance policies issued by WCF and UBIC 
insuring Pioneer were concurrent, overlapping policies and both were in effect on the day 
Antone was catastrophically injured; 
2. The matching "Other Insurance" clauses in the overlapping contracts are clear and 
unambiguous; 
3. The matching "Other Insurance" clauses obligate the two insurance carriers to 
share the administrative costs and the workers5 compensation liability equally; 
4. UBIC should reimburse WCF a 50% share of the administrative costs and the 
payment of the workers' compensation liability for Antone's injuries it has already paid; and 
5. Prospectively, UBIC should share equally with WCF the administrative costs and 
the payment of the workers'compensation liability. 
The amount of UBIC's 50% share of workers compensation liabilities with respect to 
Antone's claim is not the subject of this Order. This is the sole remaining issue between the 
parties. 
B. UBIC's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment 
UBIC's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment asked the Court for the following rulings 
and summary judgment: 
1. Pioneer never tendered the claim involving Antone to UBIC. 
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2. Once notified of the claim, Pioneer directed UBIC not to pay the claim and that 
WCF should pay it. 
3. The Targeted Tender Doctrine, under which an insured may elect which of its 
insurers is to cover the loss by tendering its defense to only one insurer, and not the other, should 
be applied in this case. Because Pioneer never tendered the claim to UBIC, the UBIC policy is 
not available to cover the loss. The "other insurance" clause is, therefore, not triggered nor may 
WCF seek equitable contribution from UBIC under the "other insurance" clause. 
r 4, Pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, WCF's motion 
should be denied to allow further discovery regarding the intent of Pioneer and UBIC with 
respect to the effective date of Pioneer's 2008 UBIC policy. 
ORDER 
Having considered the parties' respective legal positions on the cross motions for 
summary judgment filed in this matter, and after oral argument and review of the motions and 
supporting memorandums filed by the parties, the Court orders as follows: 
1. Pioneer Roofing's 2008 UBIC policy was effective beginning on February 22, 
2008. 
2. The UBIC policy effective date of February 22, 2008 is clear and unambiguous 
and is repeated some thirty times in the policy. UBIC will not be allowed to present extra-
contractual evidence in an attempt to alter this plain language found in Pioneer's 2008 UBIC 
workers compensation policy. 
3. Further factual discovery regarding the February 22, 2008 effective date of the 
UBIC policy is unnecessary and would be irrelevant under the parol evidence rule. 
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4. UBIC failed to present any legal or factual support for its premise of mutual 
mistake and the applicability of contractual reformation, particularly in the context of workers5 
compensation coverage. 
5. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §34A-2-2052, the February 22,2008 UBIC 
policy is active and covers Mr. Antone's March 21,2008 industrial accident. UBIC has not 
issued a notification of cancellation of Pioneer's 2008 UBIC policy that commenced on February 
22,2008 as required by Utah Code Annotated §34A-2-205 to cancel a workers compensation 
contract. 
6. UBIC's filing of a second policy with the Labor Commission on February 18,2011 
with the effective date of April 1,2008 does not negate the effective date of the February 22, 
2008 policy, which remained active from its inception and provided continuous coverage under 
Utah Code Annotated §34A-2-205, including the date of Mr. Antone's injury on March 21, 2008. 
The Workers Compensation Act does not allow a contract reformation after the date of loss. 
7. The identical "Other Insurance" clauses in Pioneer's overlapping 2008 UBIC and 
WCF workers compensation policies are clear and unambiguous. UBIC is contractually 
responsible under those identical "Other Insurance" clauses to pay its 50% pro-rata share of Mr. 
Antone's claim. The pro-rata share includes reimbursement to WCF for 50% of all benefits and 
2
 In relevant part, Utah Code Annotated §34A-2-205 provides the following: 
(b) A workers compensation policy is in effect from inception until canceled by filing 
with the [Industrial Accidents]division [of the Utah Labor Commission]. . .a 
notification of cancellation in the form prescribed by the division within ten days 
after cancellation of the policy, 
(c) Failure to notify the division... results in continued liability of the carrier. 
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administrative costs already paid on Mr. Antone's claim3 and a pro-rata 50% share of all future 
benefits and administrative costs that will accrue on the claim. 
8. The Court declines to apply the "Targeted Tender" doctrine in this case. Pioneer's 
tender of this claim to WCF rather than UBIC is irrelevant. This doctrine has never been adopted 
in Utah and has never been applied in a workers compensation insurance coverage case by the 
handful of other jurisdictions which have applied this doctrine. The Court rules that the 
"Targeted Tender" doctrine is a minority position which runs counter to Utah Code Annotated 
§34A-2-205 and the legislative intent evidenced by that statute. 
Based on the foregoing, WCF's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding "Other 
Insurance" is hereby GRANTED and UBIC's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. 
The Court hereby certifies, in accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) (1), that there is no 
just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment with respect to the issues resolved by this 
Order, and that the Court does hereby direct that judgment be entered. 
Dated this % day of July 2011. 
BY THE COURT 
Honorable Piul G. Maughan 
District Court Judge 
3This order does not address the reasonableness of the past benefits and administrative 
costs already paid by WCF on Mr. Antone's workers compensation claim. Those issues are still 
pending before this Court and subject to further discovery by the parties in accordance with the 
case management order in this matter. 
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1 Transcript of Hearing 
2 June 15, 2011 
3 PROCEEDINGS 
4 BAILIFF: All rise. Court is now in 
5 session, the Honorable Judge Paul Maughan 
6 presiding. 
7 THE COURT: Be seated. Good morning. 
8 (Simultaneously, "Good morning") 
9 THE COURT: We have Mr. Dyer and Mr. 
10 Taylor here, and I assume you are Mr. Black? 
11 MR. BLACK: Yes, James Black, Cynthia 
12 Daniels and Matthew Black representing the Workers 
13 Compensation Fund. 
14 THE COURT: Alright, thank you. Okay, 
15 this is an interesting issue. We're here on 
16 Workers Compensation Fund v. Utah Business 
17 Insurance Company, UBIC, case ending in 4170, and 
18 Workers Compensation Fund has brought a motion for 
19 partial summary judgment in order to get UBIC 
20 involved in this incident and as I read the file, 
21 UBIC doesn't want to do that, but as I read that 
22 correctly, and there's also a Rule 56(f) issue 
23 here. 
24 So, I've read this material and, so, 
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Matthew J . Black 
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Michael E. Dyer 
Scott R. Taylor 
BLACKBURN & STOLL 
257 East 200 South 
Suite 800 






1 rather than tell you what I'm thinking right now, I 
2 would just rather hear from each side and then I 
3 will tell you what I'm thinking. 
4 MR. BLACK: Okay. 
5 THE COURT: Yeah, so, Mr. Black, if you 
6 want to proceed. 
7 MR. BLACK: I do, and if it please the 
8 Court, we had prepared some time lines, more to 
9 assist me in what I'm going to present to you than 
10 perhaps to even help you, but will you put those up 
11 there? If it please the Court? 
12 THE COURT: Sure. 
13 MR. BLACK: This is a smaller version 
14 than the one on the easel. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. 
16 MR. BLACK: That one first. It helps 
17 me to keep myself in order to do that. 
18 THE COURT: Well, that's fine. Before 
19 you go much further, is this overlapping period, is 
20 that-do we have a dispute on that on whether there 
21 was coverage or not? 
22 MR. DYER: Your Honor-
23 THE COURT: Do you need the Court to 
24 determine that, or have you agreed on that? 
25 MR. DYER: I'm like the Court. I've 
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just seen this. 
THE COURT: Well, I know you've just 
seen this, but there has been an issue in here of 
whether your police was enforced or not at the time 
of the injury, UBICs policy. 
MR. DYER: Yes. 
THE COURT: But, do you still— 
MR. DYER: There has not been a 
stipulation that there is. For purposes of our 
counter-motion for summary judgment, we wiil agree 
that there were two policies owned by Pioneer 
Roofing for purposes of our motion, but based upon 
mutual mistake, John Stout has indicated he didn't 
want to have dual coverage. He didn't want to be 
paying for two policies and thought that the policy 
with UBIC would run afterwards. 
THE COURT: Okay, so that's still 
(inaudible) okay. 
MR. DYER: Yes. 
THE COURT: Alright. 
MR. BLACK: Okay. 
THE COURT: Sorry for that, but I was 
trying to see if I could narrow something, but I 
just opened a hornet's nest, I think. 
MR. BLACK: I appreciate that. 
Page 
1 clause, in exactly the same place in the policy, it 
2 states, for an insurance carrier, and this is a 
3 contractual term, we will not pay more than our 
4 share of damages and costs covered by this 
5 insurance and other insurance or self-insurance. 
6 All shares will be equal until the loss is paid. 
7 So, the contemplation is that there 
8 will, in fact, be times when there may be more than 
9 one policy covering a given loss and, so, there's a 
10 shared responsibility. 
11 THE COURT: And why is that the case? 
12 I'm not saying it doesn't, but why would that be 
13 the case? 
14 MR. BLACK: That would be the case just 
15 as happened here. At the end of a policy, an 
16 employer obtains another policy and the start date 
17 of that policy overlaps the end date of the other 
18 policy and this is taking into account in the 
19 Workers Compensation Act and in the Insurance Code 
20 by statutorily defining when a policy terminates 
21 and it says in 34(a)-
22 THE COURT: Before you go there-
23 MR. BLACK: Sure. 
24 THE COURT: Are there--you can stay 
25 there. It's a short question. 
Page 7 
1 THE COURT: So, alright. 
2 MR. BLACK: Your Honor, I think a basic 
3 understanding of the Workers Compensation Act 
4 requirement for insurance helps us to see how to 
5 define the issues that are here in this case. 
6 THE COURT: Sure. 
7 MR. BLACK: And the concept of the 
8 Workers Compensation Act is that these insurance 
9 policies for employers are required by statute and 
110 they are part of a quid pro quo in the Workers 
11 Compensation Act wherein the employer gives up 
12 common law defenses and the employee gives up 
13 common law causes of action that may be against the 
14 employer in exchange for the no fault benefits that: 
15 are provided by the Workers Compensation Act and as 
16 part of that process, the National Conference of 
17 Compensation Insurance, which is the rate making 
18 contractor for the-retained by the Insurance 
19 Department for establishing rates in the State of 
20 Utah, has provided for insurance carriers writing 
21 Workers Compensation Insurance, a form policy that 
22 each of the insurance carriers has to use and does 
23 use, and it did use in this case, and in the 
24 foreign policy, there is what is called another 



























MR. BLACK: Okay. 
THE COURT: Are there other situations 
other than changing insurance carriers or- to where 
there might be an overlap? 
MR. BLACK: There can be. We've run 
across other-
THE COURT: Is that the most common? 
MR. BLACK: -other situations where 
there has been a claim of overlapping insurance 
policies when they are~in owner-controlled 
insurance programs. That's where an owner hires a 
broker and they have insurance coverage for a 
project and, yet, one of the subcontractors may 
have insurance that covers him or his work 
independent of that project. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BLACK: There have been claims that 
there is overlap in that circumstance. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BLACK: And there are others that I 
could probably conjure up. 
THE COURT: That's good enough. Thank 
you. 
MR. BLACK: But, here, the concept of 
the Workers Compensation Act is that you have 
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1 mandatory insurance and there should never be a lap 
2 and they protect against any sort of temptation for 
3 mischief of having a Workers Comp contract. It may 
4 cover some employees and not other employees. They 
5 cover the entire place of business and they cover 
6 them until this happens. 
7 A Workers Compensation policy is in 
8 effect from inception, whenever you started, until 
9 cancelled by filing with the Industrial Accidents 
110 Division a notification of cancellation in the form 
11 prescribed by the Division within ten days after 
12 cancellation of the policy. Failure-and this is 
13 important-failure to notify the Division results 
14 in continued liability of the carrier. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. Help me with that 
16 one, and some of these questions may not relate 
17 directly to the issue, but I'm trying to 
18 understand. 
19 MR. BLACK: Sure. 
20 THE COURT: So, if I contract with ABC 
21 Insurance and then I don't pay the insurance 
22 premium when it's due-
23 MR. BLACK: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
24 THE COURT: -and ABC says well, then, 
125 we re not going to cover you, does this relate to 
Page 
1 MR. BLACK: If the Workers Compensation 
2 Fund is given notice that an insured doesn't want 
3 to have insurance with them anymore, and they 
4 have~and they have paid their premiums, the 
5 Workers Compensation Fund needs to go through this 
6 notice process. 
7 Likewise, once a company such as UBIC 
8 has started an insurance policy with--even if 
9 overlapping, with an insured, then it remains in 
10 effect, by statute. The coverage continues. You 
11 can't change the statute. It's there. 
12 THE COURT: Gotya. 
13 MR. BLACK: And that's what happened 
14 here, and this becomes accentuated when you note 
15 that during this overlapping period, Russell Anton 
16 had a catastrophic injury, March 21st, 2008. The 
17 overlapping period was February 22nd, 2008 to April 
18 1st, 2008 and that insurance policy-both insurance 
19 policies are form policies. They are clear on 
20 their face. They do not need interpretation. In 
21 every policy, the start date, the commencement date 
22 is indicated on the policy, not just once, in the 
23 case of the UBIC policy and all the riders, but we 
24 counted them and I think there was something like 
25 30 times it said commencement date for the policy 
Page 11 
1 both the insured and insurance company, that 
2 statute? 
3 MR. BLACK: Yes. If I'm understanding 
4 your question correctly-
5 THE COURT: Well, for instance-
6 MR. BU\CK: -there is a failure to pay 
7 timely a premium by an employer-
8 THE COURT: Right. 
9 MR. BLACK: - the employer's coverage 
110 with that insurance company continues until the 
11 insurance company gives notice of cancellation and 
12 files that notice with the Labor Commission. 
13 THE COURT: So, and the flip side is if 
14 an insured has insurance and wants to change 
15 insurance, that's where you could get double 
16 coverage? 
17 MR. BLACK: Sure. 
18 THE COURT: You could say I started 
19 here, but I didn't tell them to stop and, so- I 
20 mean, the insurance company may not-I don't mean 
21 to make this too difficult. I'm just trying to 
22 understand. So, but, there can be responsibility 
23 on both sides to counsel, I suppose. 
24 MR. BLACK: Yes, absolutely. 



























was, in fact, February 22nd, 2008. 
UBIC sent a bill to the employer for 
the partial month of February 22nd through the end 
of February, which was paid saying commencement 
date that day. 
The Workers Compensation Fund did not, 
upon learning of this overlap, tried to not pay the 
responsibility. They have paid this loss, this 
claim. Just to give Your Honor an idea of how 
serious it is has been reserved for something in 
the neighborhood of five million dollars. 
Mr. Anton is in a situation where his injuries have 
caused him to need 24 hour a day attendant care. 
THE COURT: So, this is a footnote to 
this thing, but when I read the amount, it said 1.5 
million had been paid so far. I'm assuming this is 
a very unusual circumstance. I thought-Is it true 
that Workers Compensation Fund is a sole remedy in 
certain cases? That you say, you are covered by 
Workman's Comp, so your damage is set at this 
amount and you can't-
MR. BLACK: I believe, Your Honor, you 
are discussing the exclusive remedy provision of 
the Workers Compensation Act and~ 
THE COURT: Right, a n d -
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MR. BU\CK: And that provides that the 
sole remedy for an injured worker against his 
employer or co-employees or the insurance carrier 
for the employer is the body of benefits provided 
by the Workers Compensation Act and these insurance 
policies, both of them, are identical in reflecting 1 
that they will pay those benefits that are required 
by the Workers Compensation Act. Does that answer 
the question? 
THE COURT: Yeah, this is the exclusive 
remedy, right? 
MR. BLACK: As far as I know. I 
haven't looked into third party aspects and an 
individual who is injured in the course of his 
employment still has the right to pursue a civil 
action for damages against one who is not in the 
position of employer or co-employee--
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BLACK: -against a third party, in 
other words. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'll quite 
interrupting for a while. Go ahead. 
MR. BLACK: It's okay, and this is the 
situation that is contemplated, and I'm not going 
to try to make counsel's argument, but this is the 
Page 13 
simple fact of the matter, that there was an 
overlap. Both were covered. An injury took place, 
and our Court, for example, in the Sharon Steel 
case, and I'm not positive that was cited in our 
memorandum, but Sharon Steel is 931 P.2d 127. It's 
a 1997 decision and the principles that apply when 
there are two insurance carriers on a liability 
were discussed in that case. 
It said in the third party insurance 
context, this Court has held where the insured 
settles, for example, with the tort feasor and the 
tort feasor and/or its insurance was on notice of 
the other's insurance subrogation right, then the 
settlement and release will not affect the 
insurer's right of subrogation. It's talking about 
equitable subrogation when one insurance carrier 
has paid the liability of someone, of an individual 
that is insured by more than one insurance carrier, 
and it says the overwhelming majority of states 
allow a subsequent equitable subrogation action by 
an insurer. 
We have that. We have co-insurance and 
this is the majority law, and unless Your Honor has 
questions, I would ask to respond. I know that 




















































THE COURT: Yes. 1 
MR. BLACK: And I don't want to I 
forecast his argument, but I would want to respond 1 
to it. 1 
THE COURT: You may. You may have that 1 
opportunity. Alright, Mr. Dyer, or Mr. Taylor? 1 
Who is going to- 1 
MR. DYER: Thank you, Your Honor. Your 1 
Honor, I've been handling Workers Compensation If 
cases for 29 years. It's the reason I don't appear 1 
often in District Court. I've had a number of 1 
cases with Jim over the years and I can say that 1 
he's one of only three attorneys, I think, that Jj 
have had more years in workers compensation than I I 
have in the State of Utah. 1 
MR. BU\CK: His Honor and I were in the 1 
same class. So, be careful how old- 1 
MR. DYER: Yeah, but he hasn't been 1 
doing workers compensation the whole time. 1 
MR. BLACK: I looked up and I 1 
remembered-74, so be careful with that. 1 
THE COURT: That's okay. 1 
MR. DYER: Jim, in his brief, has J 
called this case one of first impression in Utah, I 
and I agree. It's, obviously, an issue that 1 
Page 151 
doesn't come up very often. | 
I'm going to do two things. First, I'm | 
going to address our counter-motion for summary 1 
judgment, and then I'll respond to WCF's motion. 1 
Our motion is based upon the targeted 1 
tender doctrine. For the purpose of our summary I 
judgment motion only, we are assuming that there 1 
were two Workers Compensation policies held by 1 
Pioneer Roofing at the time of Mr. Anton's injury. | 
In short, the targeted tender doctrine 1 
allows an insured who has multiple policies in I 
place to designate which of the insurance companies I 
is going to provide coverage for the case. That's 1 
kind of the short definition. 1 
Courts have written the following about 1 
this targeted or selective tender doctrine. All of 11 
these cases are cited in our brief. Mutual of 1 
Enumclaw v. USF Insurance Company said this, 1 
quote: "Selective tender preserves the insured's i 
right to invoke or not to invoke the terms of its 1 
insurance contracts. The duties to defend and 1 
indemnify do not become legal obligations until a 1 
claim for defense or indemnity is tendered", close I 
quote. 1 
From London Underwriters v. Hartford, 1 
Page 161 
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1 quote: "If the policy is never triggered, the 
2 issue of liability under the other insurance clause 
3 (that was cited by Mr. Black) does not arise", 
4 close quote. 
5 And, finally, from Bituminous Casualty 
6 Corporation v. Royal Insurance, the court said 
7 this, the Supreme Court of Illinois, quote: "It is 
8 only when an insurer's policy is triggered that the 
9 insurer becomes liable for the defense and 
110 indemnity costs of a claim and it becomes necessary 
11 to allocate the loss among co-insurers. The loss 
12 will be allocated according to the terms of the 
13 other insurance clauses, if any, in the policies 
14 that have been triggered. As discussed above, 
15 Royal's policy was not triggered and its obligation 
16 to defend and indemnify Johnson Construction with 
17 regard to the Peterman lawsuit was excused by the 
18 targeted tender to Bituminous", close quote. 
19 I would like to have you consider-
20 THE COURT: So- I will just be a 
21 moment. 
22 MR. DYER: Yes, please. 
23 THE COURT: So, is it triggered based 
24 on -Who triggers it, the insured? 



























you contact a new insurer. Now, it's not your goal 
to pay twice for the same insurance. Nobody has 
that as a goal, but for whatever reason, you have a 
short period of dual coverage and, actually, during 
the period of dual coverage, same storm, same tree 
falls over, you have damage to your house. Do you 
have to file a claim against either company? No, 
you don't have to. Can you file a claim against 
one of the insurance companies? Sure, you can. 
If you make a claim against that 
insurance company, can that insurance company force 
you to file a claim against the other insurance 
company? That's really the question that's raised 
in this case. 
THE COURT: Well, is this case different 
because of the statute? 
MR. DYER: No, no, because it's all the 
matter of who has the right to trigger the policy. 
THE COURT: Well, but what you are 
asking this Court to do is not Utah law. I mean, 
to me, this principal is not established in Utah. 
MR. DYER: It's a case of first 
impression. I will grant you that, because it 
doesn't arise very often. We have been doing this 
a long time. First time it's ever come up in all 
Page 19 
1 choose. 
2 THE COURT: He decides? 
3 MR. DYER: Yes, absolutely. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. 
5 MR. DYER: In fact, I want to make that 
6 clear just by way of an example, practical example. 
7 Let's assume that you have a home and you have a 
8 homeowner's policy. During a storm, a tree falls 
9 over and damages your home. Can you make a claim 
110 against the insurance company? Yes. 
11 On the other hand, must you make a 
12 claim against your insurance company? Well, you 
13 might consider there's deductible or co-pays that 
14 you are going to have to pay. So, maybe you don't 
15 want to make that claim. If you do make a claim, 
16 your rates are going to go up. So, maybe you 
17 don't want to make that claim. If you do make a 
18 claim, you are going to have to fill out paper 
19 work. You are going to have to talk to your 
20 adjustor, be interviewed, time. So, you don't want 
21 to do that. So, you could reasonably choose not to 
22 file a claim and your choice would not be wrong or 
23 illegal in any way. 
24 Now, suppose you are at your same house 



























of our careers. That's why we call it a case of 
first impression. 
THE COURT: But-okay. But, in my 
case, a better way to ask this question is, because 
Workman's Compensation contracts or, at least-now, 
let me step back for just a moment. You are here 
for Workman's Compensation. So, was a claim filed 
under your policy? Did you have a policy, or they 
just-
MR. DYER: Yes. The way that commences 
is there's an employer's first report of injury and 
that employer's first report of injury is filed 
with the Labor Commission and with the Workers 
Compensation carrier. Upon receipt of that, which 
I will say came, unusually, a week after this 
catastrophic injury, the Workers Compensation Fund 
assumed responsibility for paying the Workers 
Compensation benefits-
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. DYER: - a n d it has been since 
then. 
THE COURT: Well, okay. So, where-
MR. DYER: So, what happened i s -
THE COURT: No, no, okay. 
MR. DYER: I'm sorry. 
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THE COURT: I'm not finished yet. I'm 
really trying to understand this. So, why~I guess 
I wasn't aware that there were multiple policies. 
You know, you hear about Workers Compensation and 
so on. So, is this a policy-How are you different 
from Workers Compensation? 
MR. DYER: Workers Compensation Fund is 1 
available to all employers in the State of Utah. | 
Some--
THE COURT: Available? 
MR. DYER: Available. Some states have 
what they call the unitary system. Everybody has 
to get insurance from one company- 1 
THE COURT: Okay. 1 
MR. DYER: -like Workers Compensation I 
Fund. Utah is not a unitary state. So, there are | 
also competing private insurance companies that 
offer Workers Compensation coverage. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. DYER: So, you have Workers 
Compensation Fund, which is the big fish in the 
pond. I think they have like sixty percent market 
share. 
THE COURT: Okay. | 
MR. DYER: And then you have smaller 
Page 21 
companies that similarly offer Workers Compensation 
Coverage. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. DYER: So, UBIC is one of the 
private insurance companies. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. DYER: So Stout, Mr. Stout, the 
owner of Pioneer Roofing, had a policy with Workers 
Compensation Fund and he shopped around and he 
found a better deal and wanted to change to UBIC 
Insurance, Workers Compensation Insurance. 
THE COURT: Okay, but with your hypo-
thank you for that explanation. 
MR. DYER: Yes. 
THE COURT: But, with your hypothetical, 
then, does that break down, your hypothetical, in 
light of this paragraph F? 
MR. DYER: Not at all. Not at all, 
because that's a policy in Workers Compensation 
Fund's policy-
THE COURT: And in yours? 
MR. DYER: And in our policy. Now, 
here's the difference. John Stout, the owner of 
Pioneer Roofing, upon the injury to Mr. Anton, knew 





















































WCF. That invoked their policy- 1 
THE COURT: Right. I 
MR. DYER: -and they started to pay. 1 
He chose not to tender it to UBIC. He didn't even 1 
tell UBIC about it for more than two years. It j 
was like I don't want to bother them. I don't 1 
report it to them. He didn't tell us about it. 1 
We didn't know about it. We had no idea that 1 
there was a claim and the policy that we have has 1 
the same provision in it, comes into effect if he j 
tenders it to us. That triggers our policy and, II 
then, this language in our policy would come into I 
effect because it would be triggered by him coming 1 
to us and saying I want to invoke my policy with 1 
you. It's Mr. Stout's ability to tender the 1 
defense. It's not a third party's ability to 1 
tender Mr. Stout's or Pioneer Roofing's own policy. 1 
THE COURT: Okay. Is this a majority 1 
or minority view? My impression is this theory on 1 
tendering for targeted or selective tender is a 1 
minority view. 1 
MR. DYER: Yes, and that's been argued 1 
by Mr. Black. Let me address that right now. 1 
THE COURT: Sure, okay, that's- 1 
MR. DYER: They argue it's quote, I'm || 
Page 23 1 
reading from their brief: "A minority position 1 
held by less than a handful of states." That's 1 
what they say in their brief, but I think their 1 
argument is misleading. Let me tell you why. II 
In our brief, we've cited cases 1 
supporting the targeted tendered doctrine from 1 
Illinois, Montana, Washington, New Hampshire, i 
Connecticut, Arizona, Minnesota, Michigan and the 1 
Seventh Circuit. That's eight states and the 1 
Seventh Circuit. These are the jurisdictions which 1 
have considered and adopted the targeted tender 1 
doctrine. 1 
On the other hand, WCF has written the 1 
35-page brief in response to our motion. AH of 1 
one and a half pages dealt with our counter-motion 1 
for summary judgment. In their motion, they have 1 
cited zero cases, zero cases where the targeted § 
tender defense doctrine has been considered by a 1 
jurisdiction and rejected. 1 
That's nine jurisdictions, eight states j 
and the Seventh Circuit, that have considered and 1 
adopted this doctrine. Zero jurisdictions which 1 
have considered and rejected the targeted tender 1 
doctrine. 1 
So, by my way of math, nine who | 
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considered it and adopted it is a hundred percent 
versus zero who have considered it and rejected it. 
There are no such cases. We looked for them, too. 
It's just-you have to look at the few cases that 
have come up. 
Remember, this is a very limited issue. 
It has never come up before in the State of Utah. 
No one is out there looking. Gee, let's see if I 
can get two different policies to cover me on one 
issue and pay double premium for it. Nobody wants 
to be in that position. It's only out of 
inadvertence, typically, that such a dual coverage 
arises. 
THE COURT: Well, that may well be, but 
that doesn't change the fact it could happen, does 
it? 
MR. DYER: Clearly. This case is the 
poster child that it could come into being. 
THE COURT: Well, okay. So, are you, 
at some point-you don't have to do it now, but at 
some point, are you going to talk about the 
inception date versus the~ 
MR. DYER: Yes. 
THE COURT: -April 1st date and this 
mutual mistake that you are talking about? 
Page 25 
MR. DYER: Yes, yes, I will. I will. 
That really comes in countering their motion as 
opposed to supporting our motion. 
THE COURT: Okay. Okay, while we are 
still here, then-
MR. DYER: Sure. 
THE COURT: -what would prevent-Okay, 
let's just say that Pioneer, you know, tendering 
this to Workers Compensation, you are saying he-
that company has the exclusive right to tender it? 
MR. DYER: Yes, if it chooses to. 
THE COURT: So, the Workers Compensation 
somehow found out that there was another policy? 
MR. DYER: Yes. We don't know how that 
happened, but somehow happened. 
THE COURT: But, somehow it did? 
MR. DYER: Yeah, sure. 
THE COURT: So, why can't they, then, 
independently just look to their contract and say, 
you know, if there's two policies here, why can't-
there's two policies; therefore, we're going to 
rely on F, and if your theory is correct, (f) 
doesn't have any meaning. 
MR. DYER: It does if John Stout, the 


















































both insurance companies. I've had an injury. I'm if 
giving you notice to both of you, then those 1 
provisions come into play, but for whatever reason, 1 
Mr. Stout only tendered the defense to WCF. He § 
never even told UBIC. I 
THE COURT: Okay. I 
MR. DYER: And once contacted and told I 
about it, he has given us his declaration. I don't 1 
want UBIC to pay this. I only want WCF to pay it. 1 
We don't know why because we haven't done any I 
discovery. Certainly, he has not been deposed, but 1 
that's his statement. I 
THE COURT: That argument could be made 1 
in all kinds of situations, you know? You know, I 
save me from myself. This is what I did, but I I 
really didn't mean to do-getting late in the 1 
morning. I'm not good at more hypothetical, but I 
you can-somebody can always say, oh, that's not 1 
what I intended. I just wanted to do this, but 1 
buy doing this, it triggered something else. I 1 
mean, so, your argument is, basically, the Court 1 
either considers or adopts the target of tender 1 
doctrine, or I have to adopt, the Court has to 1 
adopt that in order to take UBIC off the hook for 1 
liability if the Court finds dual coverage, right? 1 
Page 27 1 
MR. DYER: Yes, that's correct. 1 
THE COURT: Okay and, then- 1 
MR. DYER: If the Court doesn't find 
dual coverage, then our argument doesn't even come 1 
into play. j 
THE COURT: Right, and that's not I 
considering-I haven't considered yet your mutual 1 
mistake. 1 
MR. DYER: Correct. 1 
THE COURT: But, for adopting that 1 
theory, then UBIC is liable, right? § 
MR. DYER: Yes, if-assuming that 1 
there's dual coverage. 1 
THE COURT: Okay, s o -
MR. DYER: The idea is that Mr. Stout, 
the owner of Pioneer Roofing, is the one who gets 
to choose whether to make a claim against his own 1 
policy. 1 
THE COURT: Okay, but even though-let's 1 
alter it just a little bit- | 
MR. DYER: Yes. J 
THE COURT: -and say Pioneer says, or J 
Mr. Stout, is that correct? 1 
MR. DYER: Yes, Mr. John Stout is the 1 
owner of Pioneer Roofing. 1 
Page 28 1 
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THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Stout says, okay, 
I want Workers Compensation. I'm directing this to 
be happening. I've looked at these two and I want 
it to go to Workers-
MR. DYER: Right. 
THE COURT: --for whatever reason. I 
have an idea, but for this reason, I want to go 
here and~does that, even if the Court says-even i 
if the Court adopts this selective tender doctrine, 
can't Workers Compensation say, like probably they 
are saying, it's fine for Mr. Stout to direct the 
defense over here, but by doing so, we have this; 
unique contract provision that says we only have to 
pay equal, and now you are saying that contract 
provision doesn't apply because he tendered it only 
to WCF. 
MR. DYER: Right. If he had tendered 
it to us, then our policy would have also been 
effected. 
THE COURT: And Workman's Compensation 
is saying, not so fast, you know? You tendered it, 
but by doing so, we've got this contract provision \ 
that says if there's a second one-okay. ! 
MR. DYER: Now, that issue-
THE COURT: Have I missed something 
Page 29 
there? 
MR. DYER: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. DYER: There's one other related 
issue that I would like to address. 
THE COURT: Alright, and that is? 
MR. DYER: And that is this. Can 
insurance companies and insureds, can the parties, 
by contract, say that in the event of a dual 
coverage, when these rare things that come up, the 
insured is contractually required to make a claim 
against all policies. Can you do that? The answer 
is yes. 
There have been two cases cited in our 
brief, one in Illinois, one in California, and the 
courts in that case upheld the insurance company 
who put in a provision that said in the event of 
dual coverage, the insured must make a claim 
against all carriers that you might have for the 
claim, and that's been upheld. 
So, the question in this case, is there 
such a provision in the Workers Compensation 
policy, Workers Compensation Fund policy? The 
answer is no. There's no such provision. So, if 




















































in connection with dual coverage, if the policy 1 
holder has multiple policies or dual coverage, it 1 
must make a claim against all such carriers. Then, 1 
John Stout wouldn't have a choice. Either he would J 
actually make it or it would be constructively made 1 
for him and the claim would proceed along this 1 
provision that's been outlined here because it 1 
would be required by contract, but that provision 1 
is not contained in the WCF policy that was signed 1 
by Pioneer Roofing or by John Stout. So, I think 1 
that's related to this issue. J| 
For purposes of our motion for summary If 
judgment, we have to prove that John Stout, owner 1 
of Pioneer Roofing, did not trigger our policy. 1 
We've attached to our motion the written 1 
declaration of Mr. Stout. He says this, paragraph 1 
n i n e - 1 
THE COURT: Just a moment. Mr. Black, I 
do you have any argument with that? 1 
MR. BLACK: With? 1 
THE COURT: That Mr. Stout didn't | 
trigger your policy. 1 
MR. BLACK: Didn't trigger our policy? 1 
MR. DYER: Or, didn't trigger the UBIC? 1 
THE COURT: UBICs policy? (Inaudible) 1 
Page 31 1 
MR. BLACK: I have arguments regarding 1 
what was just presented. Do I have an argument 1 
regarding whether he triggered it? The accident 1 
triggered it. The claim triggered it. It was 1 
triggered- 1 
THE COURT: Okay. 1 
MR. BLACK: -for both carriers- I 
THE COURT: Okay. 1 
MR. BLACK: -by the event, by the loss I 
covered by the Workers Compensation Act. I 
THE COURT:' Okay. 
MR. DYER: See, but that goes back to I 
your home that gets damaged by the tree. You, I 
then, have to file a claim because the tree hitting 
the house triggers it. 1 
THE COURT: Sorry I interrupted you. 
MR. DYER: Okay, alright. 
THE COURT: I didn't save any time with 
(inaudible). 
MR. DYER: I understand. John Stout, 
in his declaration, says this, paragraph 9, quote: 
"Upon learning that there was potentially 
overlapping Workers Compensation Insurance 
coverage, Pioneer made it clear to UBIC that it did 
not want UBIC to pay the claim and that WCF should 
Page 32 | 
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1 pay it. I wrote a letter to UBIC stating this 
2 fact on October 8, 2010. Pioneer never tendered 
3 the claim to UBIC", close quote. 
4 Now, that's the declaration in our 
5 motion. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. 
7 MR. DYER: There has been nothing 
8 submitted to rebut that motion, nothing whatsoever. 
9 So, for purposes of this motion for summary 
110 judgment, the Court can assume that it's a 
11 stipulate fact, an accepted fact, that John Stout 
12 tendered the claim to WCF and affirmatively did not 
13 tender the claim to UBIC, and since that's our 
14 burden, I think that's met. 
15 THE COURT: Okay, I understand that. I 
16 understand that argument. Now, I also understand--
17 yeah, and when I say there's no dispute, what Mr. 
18 Stout did, that's what I meant. I mean, now, what 
19 he did may have had other intended consequences, 
20 but I think there's no argument as to what-
21 MR. DYER: What his position is. 
22 THE COURT: -what his position is. 
23 MR. DYER: I agree with that. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. 
125 MR. DYER: In sum, UBIC believes that 
Page 33 
1 the targeted tender defense, a case in which every 
2 jurisdiction which has considered it, nine states 
3 and a federal circuit, have agreed and adopted that 
4 policy. There's not one case cited before the 
5 Court where it has been considered and rejected. I 
6 like those odds. So, it's not really a minority 
7 ' position. It's a minority issue. It doesn't come 
8 up very much, but in the few jurisdictions where it 
9 has been discussed, it's a hundred percent in our 
10 favor, and that"s why we are asking the Court to 
11 consider this case along this doctrine because it's 
12 a case of first impressions. First time it's come 
13 up. 
14 Now, as to WCF's motion for partial 
15 summary judgment, let me address that briefly. 
16 Sorry. 
17 Number one, the motion is premature, at 
18 best. Normally, we do discovery. We take 
19 depositions. We find everything out and, then, we 
20 bring these motions. Here, we had this motion 
21 served upon us after they had received our 
22 discovery response, the written discovery 
23 responses. We hadn't even received theirs. 
24 There has not been one deposition taken, 
25 not from John Stout, not from the insurance 
Page 35 
1 the facts of this case fit perfectly with targeted 
2 tender. You have an injury on March 21, 2008. 
3 Pioneer, Mr. Stout, immediately tenders the claim 
4 to WCF. WCF pays benefits for two full years. We 
5 are given no notice whatsoever. 
6 After two years, it's not Mr. Stout that 
7 informs us. It's WCF that informs us, and WCF 
8 tries to tender the claim. 
9 In WCF's motion, page .3, paragraph 6, 
110 under statement of material facts, here's what's 
11 written, quote: "When WCF became aware of the dual 
12 coverage, it (WCF, not Mr. Stout) it asked UBIC to 
13 assume its contractual liability for the Anton 
14 claim", close quote. 
15 So, to some degree, this comes down to 
16 who gets to make a claim against an insurance 
17 policy? Is it the policy holder, Mr. Stout? We 
18 believe the answer to that is yes. Is it a third 
19 party? Yes, only if it's contracted for in the 
20 policy. If you say there's a claim made, you have 
21 to make the claim to all insurance carriers. Okay, 
22 fine. Then everybody gets notice and it's 
23 automatically tendered. 
24 Based on these facts and the tender from 
25 John Stout just to WCF, this fits perfectly with 
Page 34 
1 brokers, not from Mr. Anton, who got hurt, not from 
2 any of the insurance company that know about this 
3 case. Nobody's been deposed and I think it's 
4 premature to say, gee, we can run down and have 
5 summary judgment right after we get one set of 
6 discovery back. It's just premature. The claim 
7 should be denied on that basis alone. 
8 THE COURT: What is it that you are 1 
9 asking? I mean, the issue is-Discovery is not 
10 going to help you with the tender doctrine, is it? 
11 MR. DYER: But, at this point, because 
12 all the evidence is in our favor. That's true. 
13 THE COURT: I mean, is there anything 
14 that you seek to discover that's going to add to 
15 this selective tender doctrine or targeted? 
16 MR. DYER: No. Right now-That's why 
17 we think—It's a little early for us to bring this. 
18 I would have probably brought it at the end, but we 
19 thought since we are doing motions, we might as 
20 well raise it now because based upon the selective 
21 tender doctrine, all the facts that the Court needs 
22 to know are before it. For our motion, additional 
23 discovery won't impact that. 
24 THE COURT: Well, will it for Workman's 
25 Compensation? 
Page 36 
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1 MR. DYER: Well, they may say, gee, we 
2 can depose Mr. Stout and see if he wants to change 
3 his mind, I guess, but since it hasn't been 
4 contested today, I think the Court can accept, as a 
5 given fact, that John Stout did not tender to UBIC. 
6 It's not contested. 
7 THE COURT: Well, it's not contested 
8 that he submit the claim to Workman's Compensation. 
9 MR. DYER: Correct. 
[10 THE COURT: Now, there may be other 
11 ramifications of what he did that he didn't intend. 
12 MR. DYER: But, that's not been brought 
13 to the Court's attention or to our attention. I 
14 mean, they could maybe argue— 
15 THE COURT: Well, sure it has. Sure it 
16 has. I mean, the Court has to, then, look at 
17 some-For instance, as I understand this, Workman's 
18 Compensation is saying just the accident triggered 
19 this and by it being submitted, it triggered 
20 paragraph F, whether Mr. Stout wanted to or not. 
21 That's what happened, you know? I mean, well, let 
22 me think. 
23 I mean, I, you know, I pulled the plug 
24 in the bathtub and I intended to drain the bath 
|25 tub, but I didn't really intend to flood the 
Page 37 
1 MR. DYER: But, UBIC-and, our position 
2 is that UBIC's policy never comes into play until 
3 Mr. Stout makes the claim against the insurance 
4 company. 
5 THE COURT: I understand that's your 
6 argument. That's not WCF's argument. 
7 MR. DYER: Right. 
8 THE COURT: My question is, what 
9 discovery are you going to get that will explain 
10 that position, flush it out and change it in any 
11 way? It's a legal argument the Court is being 
12 asked to make. I'm asking how does 56(f) make a 
13 difference? 
14 MR. DYER: Well, 56(f) goes more to 
15 WCF's motion-
16 THE COURT: That's what I'm talking 
17 about. 
18 MR. DYER: Okay, and to our claim of 
19 mutual mistake. In other words, Mr. Stout says I 
20 never intended to have overlapping policies, never, 
21 never, never. Who would want to have overlapping 
22 policies? I thought that when I signed up for 
23 coverage with UBIC, my coverage with UBIC would 
24 start at the end of the WCF policy. 
25 THE COURT: Yeah, I never intended to 
Page 3i 
1 basement underneath it, but that's what happened. 
2 I mean, that's probably a poor example but, I mean, 
3 that's what Workman's Compensation is telling me is 
4 that by submitting it, and I understand the theory. 
5 You say it stops there and Workman's Compensation 
6 says it doesn't So, how is discovery going t o -
7 What will change that issue? You are either 
8 covered or you are not. 
9 MR. DYER: Not on the targeted tender 
110 defense. I don't believe additional discovery-it 
11 may shed nuances on it, but I think that there's 
12 enough information now for-
13 THE COURT: Okay, you've said that. 
14 So, tell me, on the other side, discovery is going 
15 to help what, whether it was triggered or not? I 
16 mean, that's (inaudible). 
17 MR. DYER: No, no. Discovery on the 
18 targeted tender issue, I don't think i s -
19 THE COURT: No, no, no. Workman's Comp 
20 is saying just by submitting it to us, that 
21 provision applies to you. I mean, it's kind of 
22 interwoven with your targeted tender. It either is 
23 or it isn't, and if it isn't, Workman's 
24 Compensation is saying Court, will you please read 
25 (f) to get UBIC to share in that loss in this? 
Page 38 
1 have binding— 
2 MR. DYER: I never intended to have 
3 dual coverage. 
4 THE COURT: I never intended to have 
5 binding arbitration. I never saw that. I never 
6 read that. I would never do that if I knew it was 
7 in there, but it's there. I mean, he signed it. 
8 MR. DYER: He did sign it. 
9 THE COURT: And he got the policy and 
10 mutual mistake, I mean, I don't know if it's mutual 
11 or unilateral mistake. I don't know what it is, 
12 but-
13 MR. DYER: Well, see, that's why we 
14 haven't taken any depositions to find out. 
15 THE COURT: Why is that not just a 
16 legal argument? 
17 MR. DYER: Well, suppose we find out 
18 that there's a history of this kind of thing that's 
19 gone on-
20 THE COURT: Well, there's not a history 
21 because you just admitted it's not. 
22 MR. DYER: Well, we don't know. 
23 THE COURT: I mean, it's a rare event. 
24 MR. DYER: It's a rare event, but I 
25 don't know how common it is. We haven't done any 
Page 40 
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1 discovery. I don't know. 
2 THE COURT: Well, it's rare enough that 
3 it's first impression here. 
4 MR. DYER: It is, to my knowledge. I 
5 don't know of any other cases of this type that 
6 have arisen. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. Then, I need to make 
8 a quick phone call, and then let's talk about 
9 mutual mistake or whatever else you need to bring 
110 this together. I don't want to keep you here. I 
11 think I understand the primary argument, the issue 
12 here. Mutual mistake is something else. I'll give 
13 you a chance, obviously, to respond to both of 
14 these, but I need to make a phone call and I'll be 
15 right back. 
16 (Recess) 
17 THE COURT: Mr. Dyer, if you want to 
18 come back up and talk about the mutual mistake, or 
19 are you through on your other issue? 
20 MR. DYER: Yeah, I'm through with the 
21 other issue. 
22 THE COURT: Okay, thank you. 
23 MR. DYER: The only thing I was going 
24 to mention is that with mutual mistake, we've 
|25 alleged facts that there is a mutual mistake as to 
Page 41 
1 because it was a mutual mistake. It didn't know 
2 either that the policy had created dual coverage, 
3 no idea. Once it found out that there was dual 
4 coverage, it was like oh, well, nobody intended 
5 that. 
6 THE COURT: No one intended to flood 
7 the basement, but it happened. S o ~ 
8 MR. DYER: I understand mistakes happen 
9 and mistakes happen that people don't want to have 
10 happen and in this case, Mr. Stout didn't want to 
11 have dual coverage and pay for two policies that 
12 only provided him one coverage. 
13 THE COURT: Well, who is in the best 
14 position to know what the coverage period is with 
15 WCF? 
16 MR. DYER: Who is in the best position 
17 to know what the policy was for the WCF policy? 
18 THE COURT: Yeah. 
19 MR. DYER: WCF. 
20 THE COURT: No, Mr. Stout. He should 
21 know when his policy expires. 
22 MR. DYER: Presumably. I haven't 
23 deposed him. I don't know. You would assume that 
24 he would know. 
25 THE COURT: Okay, well, let me hear 
Page 43 
I 1 dual coverage coming into play or occurred as a 
2 result of mutual mistake, and WCF disputes our 
3 claims. 
4 THE COURT: Well, who made the mistakes? 
5 MR. DYER: Well, the mistake is made, 
6 primarily, first by John Stout, who said, didn't 
7 mean to have coverage. Didn't intend to have 
8 coverage until after the policy came into play. 
9 Now, maybe the broker who sold him the policy 
110 filled it out wrong and he didn't explain it to 
11 him, didn't see it. Who knows? 
12 THE COURT: Well, can the Court look at 
13 that? 
14 MR. DYER: Can the Court look at the 
15 policy? 
16 THE COURT: No, what the broker said. 
17 I mean, if the contract is not ambiguous on its 
18 face, can I look at parole evidence? 
19 MR. DYER: On mutual mistake, the parole 
20 evidence is admissible. We've argued that. 
21 THE COURT: Well, whose-The mutual 
22 mistake is UBIC and Mr. Stout? 
23 MR. DYER: Yes, yes, absolutely. UBIC 
24 assumed that its policy would go into effect after 



























what you have to say. 
MR. DYER: So, I'm just saying that 
there are issues on that particular issue with 
mutual mistake that could be flushed out with 
discovery, and that has not occurred at all. So, 
that's why I think that it's premature and, then, 
finally, WCF's position relative to this time chart 
and that sort of thing presumes that WCF gets to 
override John Stout's ability to tender a claim to 
its own insurance company. It's not John Stout 
that gets to decide. WCF gets to decide and we 
think that, based upon the targeted tender rule, 
that that's just wrong. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. DYER: Only Mr. Stout should be 
able to make that claim. 
THE COURT: Alright. 
MR. DYER: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Black? 
MR. BLACK: Let me just address what 
was last said about the targeted tender. It isn't 
WCF that decides. It's not UBIC that decides when 
the coverage is. It is decided by the statute. 
Once a policy is put in place and filed with the 
Labor Commission, the Utah Code provides that it is 
Page 4<! 
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1 from that point of inception until there is a 
2 notice to cancel properly filed, both with the 
3 employer, the insured and the insurance company, 
4 that policy continues, and what is the kick-off 
5 point? 
6 The kick-off point of the dual coverage 
7 is March 21st-of the liability is March 21st, 2008, 
8 when Mr. Anton was injured. To allow this targeted 
9 tender in a circumstance of a statutory scheme, 
110 such as Workers Compensation, invites the mischief 
11 the compensation scheme was designed to prevent and 
12 that is picking and choosing. That does not happen 
13 in the Workers Compensation Act. 
14 Not one of these cases cited by Mr. 
15 Dyer, in fact, deals with the Workers Compensation 
16 circumstance. They deal with private insurance of 
17 liability in which-and construction sites where 
18 there has been a general contractor and a 
19 subcontractor, and in one or both of those 
20 contracts, there's an agreement to hold the other 
21 harmless and purchase insurance, purchase insurance 
22 to cover and name the other as insured. That's the 
23 circumstance, and that's where all the noise is in 
24 Illinois. 
125 Now, I searched and there are not-I did 
Page 4 5 
1 start at this time. Think about what would happen 
2 if this isn't your homeowner policy. This is a 
3 statutory required policy, and it's required to the 
4 benefit of both the employer and that injured 
5 worker. 
6 Let's suppose we have the same 
7 situation. The insurer, the roofing company, the 
8 insured, the roofing company says, let's take Utah, 
9 the Workers Compensation Fund out of that 
10 altogether and they have insurance that starts here 
11 and that, obviously, covers it, but let's say they 
12 come down there, well, we didn't intend for it to 
13 start there. We wanted it to start over here. 
14 Then, they manipulate it to eliminate the liability 
15 that has already occurred. 
16 That is what mischief the Act is 
17 designed to prevent, and think about this just for 
18 a minute. This is a contractual obligation, the 
19 other insurance. It's in both policies. So, if he 
20 selects one over the other in this format that is 
21 being prescribed for a selective tender, he 
22 breaches one contract or the other. 
23 The only way you don't breach one 
24 contract or the other is to apply the other 
25 insurance. You apply the other insurance. That's 
Page 4 7 
1 not find one case where the Workers Compensation 
2 system of a state was put into this circumstance. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. 
4 MR. BLACK: Not one case. 
5 THE COURT: Alright. Can you talk to 
6 me about the mutual mistake? 
7 MR. BLACK: I can, indeed. Mutual 
8 mistake of fact, indeed, is a methodology of 
9 reforming a contract. Not a Workers Compensation 
110 contract, because it's governed by statute. If the 
11 Workers Compensation contract is in place, you have 
12 to go through the process to cancel it, and why do 
13 you do that? Let me see the second poster. 
14 Why do we do that? We do that and the 
15 Legislature did that to avoid the kind of 
16 circumstance that has taken place here. If we 
17 follow this timeline, you will note, Your Honor, 
18 that when UBIC was notified, they wait a good long 
19 time, and then they start doing these things with 
20 the insured to get letters from him saying, well, I 
21 didn't intend this. I didn't intend that. That's 
22 why the statute is this way, so that there would be 
23 that responsibility. 
24 Once that insurance is in place, you 
25 can't go back and say I didn't intend for it to 
Page 4 6 
1 how the whole system is designed and, Your Honor, 
2 there is a case, and it's a well-reasoned case, in 
3 which-what did I do with my glasses? I'm getting 
4 to that point. 
5 Minnesota, originally, adopted a form of 
6 this selective tender and here's how they respond 
7 to it in the Supreme Court of Minnesota in the case 
8 of Cargill, Inc. v. Ace American Insurance Co. 
9 They say, although some jurisdictions have held, as 
10 we did-they are overturning an earlier decision, 
11 in Iowa National-that a primary insurer cannot 
12 obtain contribution from a co-primary insurer that 
13 refused to defend, these cases represent the 
14 minority view. Most courts have held that an 
15 insurer has an equitable right, whether by 
16 contribution or subrogation, to recover defense 
17 costs, at least partially, when primary insurers 
18 also have a duty to defend a common insured. 
19 That principle applies equally to the 
20 indemnification responsibility, and that is totally 
21 consistent with the case I cited to Your Honor 
22 earlier of Sharon Steel that talks about equitable 
23 subrogation in Utah; albeit, not in the Workers 
24 Compensation. I don't believe this was in the 
25 Workers Compensation setting, but that is, indeed, 
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the law of Utah. 
There's no reason to go out and pick up 
a splinter selective tender theory from a few 
states. I looked. I didn't find nine that 
supported it, and that may be a failing of my 
research. 
THE COURT: That's okay. 
MR. BLACK: But, there is no benefit, 
and what is the benefit to the insured in this case 
to selecting one over the other? There really is 
no benefit to it. There is no benefit because the 
NCCI, that's the rate making organization of which 
I spoke, the accidents that occur in a given 
employment follow the insured. So, when he applies 
for insurance from another insurance carrier, that 
experience follows him and has an affect on his 
premiums. So, he can't even benefit from this 
selective choice. That isn't the way the Workers 
Compensation Act has been set up. 
And, mutual mistake of fact? You don't 
recreate a contract after the liability event 
occurs, and there are responsibilities that flow 
from that. When an application for a hearing, for 
example, in a disputed claim is filed before the 
Labor Commission, the Labor Commission advises of 
Page 4 9 
who the insurance carriers are. They have to file, 
the insurance carriers have to file over at the 
Labor Commission for this period of time. Even 
today, both carriers are named as insurance 
carriers for the roofing company. 
Your Honor, this is a matter of partial 
summary judgment that is appropriate. There aren't 
facts that change the circumstance, other than the 
fact that there are all these machinations, after 
the complaint was filed, to secure letters from the 
insured after the complaint was filed and, on 
February 18th, after discovery was-after the 
initial discovery, they have a copy of the reformed 
contract trying, at that time, to refer back to 
February and undo the February 18th, 2008 date of 
inception of the contract. That is the sort of 
mischief that is to be avoided. 
THE COURT: Wait just a minute. What's 
this reformed contract? 
MR. BLACK: March 28th, 2011. 
THE COURT: They went back and~ 
MR. BLACK: They supplemented their 
discovery with a copy of a reformed contract that 
was drafted February 18th, 2011, trying to refer 
back and establish a new commencement date for the 



















































original contract. 1 
THE COURT: Okay. I 
MR. BLACK: So, Your Honor, that is the I 
sort of thing that the Act prevents happening when 1 
you stay, when your policy stays in force until you 1 
follow the procedures set forth by the Legislature I 
to cancel it, and the liabilities are fixed as of 1 
the date of loss, and unless you have questions, 1 
I'm finished. 1 
THE COURT: I do have a question. I 
MR. BLACK: Okay. 1 
THE COURT: And still going with this 1 
mutual mistake. I mean, if, under the statute, if 1 
you submit a contract or I don't know. Do you 1 
submit it, or do you submit notice of a contract? I 
MR. BLACK: The contract, once entered 1 
into, is filed with the Utah Labor Commission. 11 
THE COURT: Okay, and that- I 
MR. BLACK: And, then, it's enforced. I 
This statute comes into play. 1 
THE COURT: And, then, this UBIC policy I 
was filed with the Labor Commission? j 
MR. BLACK: Yes, yes, yes. 1 
THE COURT: Okay. 1 
MR. BLACK: The UBIC policy that had 1 
Page 51 I 
the conception date of February 22nd- 1 
THE COURT: Twenty-second. 1 
MR. BLACK: -was, indeed, filed with 1 
the Labor Commission. Exhibits that we have given 1 
Your Honor show that UBIC billed the insured for 1 
the partial month of February 22nd t o - 1 
THE COURT: When they were- 1 
MR. BLACK: -March 1st, and then 1 
continued billing from then. There was payment for J 
that policy from the commencement date. 1 
THE COURT:* March or April? March or | 
April? I don't know that it matters, but- 1 
MR. BLACK: From then on. From 1 
February 22nd on, there was a billing for partial 1 
money- 1 
THE COURT: Okay. I 
MR. BLACK: - in which it stated that 
the inception date is February 22nd. 1 
THE COURT: Okay. I think I understand 1 
what the issue is. I will take this under 1 
advisement. I will have a decision probably within J 
a week, maybe ten days and I will have that out to 1 
you quickly. 1 
MR. BLACK: Thank you. I 
THE COURT: Anything else this morning? 1 
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XL Specialty Ins. Co. v. Patrol Helicopters, Inc., CV-08-73-BU-RFC-JCL. (MTDC) 
XL SPECIALTY INSURANCE CO., Plaintiff, 
v. 
PATROL HELICOPTERS, INC., C. THOMAS MESSICK, Individually and as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Theresa J. Messick; CRAIG A BOWMAN, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Joan R. Bowman, DARRELL E. BOWMAN, and PROGRESSIVE 
CASUALTY INS. CO., Defendants. 
No. CV-08-73-BU-RFC-JCL. 
United States District Court, D. Montana, Butte Division. 
December 21, 2009. 
ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE 
RICHARD F. CEBULL, District Judge. 
Plaintiff XL Specialty Insurance Company filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that it 
owes no duty to defend or indemnify Defendant Patrol Helicopters for a July 2006 automobile accident. 
Magistrate Judge Jeremiah C. Lynch has entered Findings and Recommendations (Doc. 69) on the 
parties' motions for summary judgment, concluding that the XL's policy provides coverage for the accident, 
that XL's duty to defend was triggered by a letter from counsel for plaintiffs in the underlying lawsuit, and 
that Progressive cannot seek equitable contribution from XL. These conclusions result in a 
recommendation that Patrol Helicopters Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 38) be granted, that XL's 
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 41) be granted in part, and that Progressive's Motion for Summary 
Judgment Regarding Priority of Insurance (Doc. 43) be denied. 
Upon service of a magistrate judge's findings and recommendation, a party has 10 days to file 
written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). XL filed timely objections on November 9, 2009 (Doc. 70), while 
Progressive filed objections three days later (Doc. 73). Numerous responses were filed until the flood of 
briefs ceased on December 4, 2009. The objections require the Court to review de novo those portions of 
the Findings and Recommendations to which objection is made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). As discussed 
below, Magistrate Judge Lynch's Findings and Recommendations are well-grounded in law and fact and 
all objections are ovemLled. 
XL's first objection is to Judge Lynch's conclusion that coverage was not precluded by Patrol's 
failure to comply with the notice provision in the insurance policy. Judge Lynch concluded that even if XL 
could prove that it did not receive notice "immediately" or "as soon as practicable" as required by the 
policy, XL could not prove it was prejudiced by the delay. Although XL now claims that a showing of 
prejudice is not required, it did not offer this argument to Judge Lynch. For that reason, the Court need not 
consider it now. Regardless, Judge Lynch thoroughly reviewed Montana law in the area and correctly 
concluded the Montana Supreme Court, consistent with the majority ofjurisdictions, would impose a 
prejudice requirement for notice provisions in liability policies. To the extent XL argues that it was 
prejudiced, it merely repeats the arguments made to Judge Lynch. XL's first objection is overruled. 
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XL also objects to the conclusion that the subject accident arose out of the use of the insured 
helicopter. Again, XL repeats the same arguments that Magistrate Judge Lynch addressed and rejected. 
The holding that the phrase "arising out of is ambiguous when undefined has previously resulted in 
insurance coverage in contravention of common sense. See Mitchell v. American Reliable Ins. Co., 2009 
WL 3326418 (9th Cir. 2009) citing Pablo v. Moore, 995 P.2d 460 (Mont. 2000). That rule, however, is the 
law which this Court must follow. Because the accident would not have occurred absent the use or 
maintenance of Patrol's helicopter, XL's second objection must be overruled. 
XL's final objection is a continuation of its argument that its duty to defend Patrol in the 
underlying suit was never triggered because neither Patrol nor Progressive, the co-insurer, asked it to 
defend. As noted by Judge Lynch, however, the duty to defend is triggered by knowledge of facts that 
represent a risk covered by an insurance policy. Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co. v. Staples, 90 P3d 381, 385 
(Mont. 2004). Here, XL was notified by a letter from the underlying plaintiffs' counsel, together with a copy 
ofthe complaint, that set forth facts representing a risk covered by the XL policy. Accordingly, XL's third 
objection is overruled. 
Progressive objects to Judge Lynch's conclusion that because both Patrol and Progressive did 
not affirmatively request assistance from XL, the selective tender rule bars equitable contribution and XL is 
not liable. Progressive first argues its motion for summary judgment is not based on equity, but on the 
plain language ofthe "other insurance" clauses in its and XL's insurance policies. According to 
Progressive, equitable contribution does not apply because no claim has yet been paid, citing Casualty 
Indemnity Insurance Co., 902 F.Supp. at 1237 (the "doctrine of equitable contribution' permits an insurer, 
which has paid a claim, to seek contribution directly from other insurers who are liable for the same loss"). 
Regardless, as noted by Judge Lynch, Casualty Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Liberty National Fire 
Insurance Co., 902 F.Supp. 1235 (D. Mont. 1995) makes clear that the issue here is equitable contribution. 
Similarly, Progressive claims Judge Lynch overlooked the insurance policies' "other insurance" 
provisions. The other insurance provisions, however, are inapplicable-there is no other insurance because 
neither Patrol nor Progressive tendered the claim to XL for defense or indemnification. 
As to this finding of fact, Progressive also objects. Although the statement of facts contained in 
Progressive's objections documents several instances of contact between the lawyers representing Patrol 
and XL, including that XL was asked to "investigate coverage" under its policy, there is no evidence that 
Progressive or Patrol affirmatively asked XL for defense or indemnification. Judge Lynch correctly 
concluded that under Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. V. Gulflns. Co., 776 F.2d 1380 (7th Cir. 1985), 
which this Court cited with approval in Casualty Indemnity Insurance Co., asking XL to "investigate 
coverage" is insufficient. 
After a de novo review, the Court determines the Findings and Recommendation of Magistrate 
Judge Ostby are well grounded in law and fact and HEREBY ORDERS they be adopted in their entirety: 
(1) Patrol's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED; 
(2) XL's Motion for Summary Judgment barring Progressive from seeking equitable 
contribution is GRANTED, but XL's motion is DENIED in all other respects; and 
(3) Progressive's Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Priority of Insurance is DENIED. 
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The Clerk of Court shall notify the parties ofthe entry of this Order and enter judgment 
accordingly. 
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PRESTWICH LUMBER CO., UNITED 
STAFFING ALLIANCE (uninsured), 
WORKERS1 COMPENSATION FUND, 
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND, 
RODNEY PRESTWICH, RONALD 
PRESTWICH and DEBBIE PRESTWICH, 
Defendants. 
United Staffing Alliance and its workers compensation insurance carrier, Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Company, (referred to jointly as "Liberty Mutual") ask the Utah Labor Commission to 
review the Administrative Law Judge's determination that Liberty Mutual is liable for Jaime 
Zavala's workers' compensation benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"; 
Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.). 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Pursuant to §34A-2-205 of the Act, is Liberty Mutual liable for Mr. Zavala's workers' 
compensation benefits solely on the grounds that Liberty Mutual notified the Commission it was Mr. 
Zavala's employer's insurance carrier? 
BACKGROUND 
On May 7,1998, Mr. Zavala was injured in a work-related accident at Prestwich Lumber Co. 
("Prestwich") The parties agree that Mr. Zavala is entitled to workers' compensation benefits for his 
injuries. Liberty Mutual and the Uninsured Employers' Fund ("UEF") have jointly paid such 
benefits, subject to adjustment after their respective liabilities are finally determined. 
It appears that at the time of Mr. Zavala's accident, Prestwich had no workers' compensation 
insurance. Sometime after the accident, Prestwich entered into an employee leasing agreement with 
United Staffing Alliance. By virtue of that agreement, Prestwich obtained workers' compensation 
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JAIME ZAVALA 
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insurance through Liberty Mutual. It is unclear whether Prestwich informed either United Staffing 
Alliance or Liberty Mutual of Mr. Zavala's accident and injuries. 
On June 21, 1998, Liberty Mutual notified the Commission that is had provided workers' 
compensation coverage for Prestwich effective May 2, 1998. However, the parties now dispute 
whether Prestwich's insurance coverage was to be backdated to: a) May 2,1998, five days before the 
accident; or b) May 11, 1998, four days after Mr. Zavala's accident. The parties agree that these 
questions of fact relate to the terms and conditions of the underlying insurance contract and must be 
resolved by a court of general jurisdiction, rather than the Commission. Liberty Mutual has 
instituted proceedings in the District Court for that purpose. 
While the UEF acknowledges the necessity of District Court action to determine the terms of 
the underlying insurance contract between Liberty Mutual and Prestwich, the UEF contends that 
§34A-2-205(l) of the Act1 constitutes a separate and independent basis to hold Liberty Mutual liable 
for Mr. Zavala's benefits. The UEF further argues that the Commission may exercise jurisdiction to 
decide this specific issue without reference to the pending District Court proceedings. 
The ALJ has accepted the UEF's arguments and concluded that, regardless of the parties' 
actual intent or any other considerations, Liberty Mutual's notice to the Commission of the May 2, 
1998, coverage date results in Liberty Mutual1 s absolute liability for Mr. Zavala's workers' 
compensation benefits. Liberty Mutual now seeks Commission review of the ALJ's decision. 
A 
Section 34A-2-205(l) provides as follows: 
(a) Every insurance carrier writing workers' compensation insurance coverage in 
this state or for this state, regardless of the state in which the policy is written, 
shall file notification of that coverage with the division or its designee within 30 
days after the inception date of the policy in the form prescribed by the division. 
(b) A policy described in Subsection (l)(a) is in effect from inception until 
canceled by filing with the division or its designee a notification of cancellation in 
the form prescribed by the division within ten days after the cancellation of a 
policy. 
(c) Failure to notify the division or its designee under Subsection (l)(b) will result 
in the continued liability of the carrier until the date that notice of cancellation is 
received by the division or its designee. 
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This case presents tangled facts superimposed against a statute that is not crystal clear. 
These difficulties are compounded by the related proceedings that are going forward in the District 
Court. 
The Commission has some reservations regarding the correctness of the proposition that an 
insurance carrier's notice of coverage filed with the Commission will, in every case, result in the 
carrier's absolute liability for workers' compensation benefits. While such a proposition may be 
appropriate in most situations, a different result may be necessary on occasion. One possible 
exception is noted in Larson's Workers'Compensation Law, §150.02(4): 
The only situation in which the insurance would be defeated for all purposes 
by act of the employer is that in which the insurance is absolutely void ab initio, 
rather than voidable; this would occur if the employer attempted to insure against an 
accident that had already occurred, by pre-dating the insurance and fraudulently 
concealing the known existence of an accident within the period so covered. 
It is possible that the circumstances discussed by Professor Larson may be present in this 
case. Consequently, the Commission cannot say as a matter of law that §34A-2-205(l) makes 
Liberty Mutual absolutely liable for Mr. Zavala's benefits. Any such determination requires 
additional findings of fact. 
Because this matter is proceeding in the District Court, which has general jurisdiction to 
determine the facts and apply relevant law to ascertain the relationships among the parties, the 
Commission considers it improvident to go forward with its own parallel adjudicative proceedings. 
Consequently, the Commission remands this matter to the ALJ with instructions to hold this matter 
in abeyance pending the District Court's determination. Either party may then request the ALJ to 
adjudicate any issues within the Commission's jurisdiction that remain unresolved at that time. 
ORDER 
This matter is remanded to the ALJ for further action consistent with this decision. It is so 
ordered. 
Dated this 30th day of April, 2001. 
R. Lee Ellertson 
Utah Labor Commissioner 
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